386 
FIELD ARTILLERY POSITIONS. 
change in the employment of the German artillery. Placed at the 
head of the marching columns, it appeared with the foremost on the 
battle-fields, mostly preparing the great offensive blows. Fearlessly 
holding to the position which it once took up, it may be said to have 
formed a solid frame-work to the order of battle, whilst the French 
batteries only appeared as an easily transferable force.” 1 
I remember, too, the way in which some of the French batteries were 
handled at Beaumont. During that battle the French artillery, which 
crossed the heights south of Le Fays Copse, endeavoured, by repeated 
changes of position, to avoid the effect of the German guns, which 
were superior to them in every other quality but mobility, entirely 
futilely, however, for we find they had eventually to retire from the 
field. I will not enter into a more detailed account of this or other 
battles, nor indeed do I wish to repeat what must already be very 
generally known. 
The experiences of the war of ^70 may be briefly summed up in say¬ 
ing that they particularly demonstrated the decisive superiority of the 
German artillery, and a closer examination will convince everyone that 
that superiority was due to the powerful shell fire its guns were capable 
of, combined with the able leadership that commanded them, and not 
to any evolutions or manoeuvring on the battle-field. 
The broad features of the artillery tactics of the victors stand out 
clearly and unmistakably. The guns occupied a forward place on the 
line of march. Concentrated in masses, they took up well-selected 
positions early in the day and utilised the advantages they possessed 
in armament by remaining in them for long-continued periods and 
wasted no time in hasty or ill-considered movements. They could 
have moved just as well as the French did had it been desirable, or 
could they by doing so have enhanced the value of their fire. They 
did do so when it was necessary to conform to the infantry, or establish 
a success gained by them, but it may in general be said of their tactics 
that they were distinguished by the time the artillery remained in the 
positions selected for them. 
Another feature of the German manner of fighting, as it will surely 
be imitated by all other nations in the future, has an important bearing 
on the question we are considering. Their batteries were massed to¬ 
gether in long lines. Now it is evident that if batteries be scattered 
more or less singly among other troops, it may be possible to move a 
battery from one position to another during an engagement without 
the effect of the diminution of artillery fire, while it is in transit, being 
seriously felt. But to uproot a great mass of batteries, and by doing 
so to cause a cessation of fire on a large and noticeable scale, is 
obviously a very different affair. Such an undertaking would not be 
without an influence on the progress of the entire battle, and could not 
be entered on unless some corresponding movement on the part of 
the other troops demanded it. 
One point more. During the final stages of an attack, should 
1 German official account. 
