394 
FIELD ARTILLERY POSITIONS. 
if in action in the open the gunners would desert their guns; but 
that the custom of always firing from behind cover would, to quote a 
German writer, “ tend to paralyse the wholesome spirit of initiative.” 
It is only necessary to read Prince Kraft's comparison of the part 
played by the artillery in 1866 and 1870 to see how habits of peace do 
tend to keep back an arm in war—without any reason to impute actual 
cowardice. Last year Major Keir evidently felt this himself, for he 
“^Proceed 1 - 
iilgs” 6 ' “ When we call to mind the absurd lengths to which the deliberate 
April, 1896. was one time carried, we may well shrink from a retrograde 
tendency in this direction; and visions of the indirect method at 
600 yards and a perpetual search for cover rise before us.” (The 
italics are mine.) 
This year, however, in criticising my remarks, he says :— 
“ Are not our officers capable of deciding when cover should be used 
and when it should not be used, when to advance and when to remain 
behind cover ? ” 
My contention is this. If in manoeuvres you train batteries continually 
to use fire from behind cover and to remain in their positions when the 
infantry advance, then when in war the infantry require the support 
of the artillery, they will not be there. We shall have again the 
infantry saying to the artillery, as Prince Kraft tells us they did to him 
at Nachod:— 
“ Here you are at last! Where in the world have you been ? We 
had to allow innumerable guns of the enemy to overwhelm us with 
a hail of projectiles. We kept on looking to see if you were coming, 
but you did not come.” 
Do not, in fact, these very papers of Captain Pilcher's and Major 
Keir's show that this under-cover business is having this very effect in 
Germany ? 
Captain Pilcher says :— 
“When once established in a good position the German artillery 
are most averse to leaving it and I have never at German manoeuvres 
seen the artillery brought up close to the infantry lines previous to an 
assault .” 
Another officer quoted by Major Keir says :— 
“ I saw a division and the army corps attack a masked (marked ?) 
enemy and on each occasion the guns , . . never changedposition, 
the range being about 2500.” 
Instance after instance could be quoted to show the effect of the 
close support of artillery, when the object of their advance to close 
range was not such a specific object as knocking down the walls of a 
village, as Captain Pilcher says, but of giving a fresh impulse and 
support to the wavering infantry. Yon Hoenig describes how, when 
the 28th brigade were attacking at Koniggratz, a battery drove to the 
front at a rapid rate through the skirmishers and, unlimbering in front 
of them, opened fire with case at 400 yards. He says :— 
“ I have never seen a battery handled with such determination or 
tactical instinct and with such brilliant results. It was the initiative, 
