526 
SIEGE OF SEBASTOPOL. 
From the first, the fire from the French batteries was observed to be 
less vigorous than that from the English, and about 9 a.m. a magazine 
was unfortunately blown up by a Russian mortar shell in their works 
opposite to the Flagstaff Bastion, followed two or three hours later by 
another in the same locality, and from a similar cause. The wreck and 
loss of life from these explosions were so serious that the French seemed 
completely discouraged, and hardly fired a shot afterwards. On the 
other hand, although under a heavy cannonade, intensified when the 
French batteries became silent, matters -were very different with the 
English, the superiority of whose fire over the batteries opposed to 
them was soon apparent. The Malakoff tower and its works were 
silenced; many guns in the Redan were put out of action ; and at 2 
p.m., a magazine exploded, blowing out the right face of that work with 
immense damage, silencing the remaining effective guns, and carrying 
consternation among the troops drawn up in rear of the Russian works 
ready to meet an assault. There can be little doubt that had the 
French performed their part on this day as effectively as the English, 
an attack that evening would have enabled the Allies to make lodg¬ 
ments in the principal Russian works, and that the fall of the south 
side of Sebastopol would probably soon have taken place. So great, 
however, was the collapse of the French siege works, that they were 
not even next morning in a position to resume the bombardment, by 
which time the enemy had repaired and rearmed theirs, and although 
the English batteries on this day again overpowered the Malakoff and 
the Redan, yet the inability of the French to subdue the fire of 
the Flagstaff Bastion, rendered the project of an assault out of the 
question, and it was therefore decided to extend and advance the siege 
works, and prepare for a renewal of the bombardment with greater 
resources. 
We may pass over the attacks made by the Russians at the battles of 
Balaclava and Inkerman, the hardships and sufferings endured by the 
armies during the inclement winter of 1854, and the difficulties 
experienced, owing to defective transport and a road-less country, in 
bringing guns, mortars, ammunition, stores, provisions and forage from 
Balaclava to the front, all of which retarded the work in the trenches, 
and the arming of the new batteries. In consequence of these draw¬ 
backs, it was not until April that the Allies were in readiness to 
renew the bombardment. Since that in October, at the furthest point 
of the Left Attack, on the edge of the ravine, called by us the Valley of 
the Shadow of Death, there had been added two new batteries, contiguous 
one to another, and numbered 7 and 8. But the state of the 
ground, owing to continuous rain, had prevented their being armed by 
the date upon which it was decided to again open fire on the fortress. 
It may be mentioned here, that in arming the batteries, the 
guns on sling carts, sling waggons, or platform waggons, were 
brought by the Horse or Field Artillery to the rear of the first parallel, 
where they were met by strong fatigue parties, who, by means of drag 
ropes and man harness, hauled them to their respective positions. The 
work, owing to the nature of the approaches, was very arduous, and 
frequently from the enemy’s fire, very hazardous. The guns used by 
the Royal Artillery were, for the most part, mounted on travelling 
carriages. For manning the different calibres, the number of men was 
as follows :— 
