SIEGE OF SEBASTOPOL. 
529 
of the siege by Captain (now General Sir) Michael Biddulph,* * * § R.A., 
then an assistant engineer.- Sketches II. and III. are contributed by 
Colonel C. E. S. Scott,| from “ rough but accurate ” drawings made by 
him at a later date. The three sketches are intended to give a general 
idea of the position, and are not supposed to depict exactly every par¬ 
ticular embrasure, etc. 
The Russian ordnance consisted of Canons, Canon Caronades, 
Licornes (Howitzers), Caronades, and Mortiers. The majority of 
pieces disposed along their front were Canons and Canon Caronades of 
36 and 24, and they had also twenty-six 68-prs., two of which were in 
the Redan, and three in the Flag-staff. The calibre of their guns it 
will thus be seen bore a close resemblance to ours, and that the number 
they would bring to bear on the Left Attack, excluding the Creek 
batteries, was 128, to which we opposed but 65, though supported by 
those of the 67 pieces in the Right Attack which fired on the Redan. It 
must be remembered, however, that in April the Russians were very 
short of powder, and it is believed only fired from such of their guns 
as were most favourably situated. After having thus detailed the 
enemy’s strength as compared with ours, we return to the bombardment. 
As previously stated, it was fixed to begin in April, and accordingly 
on the morning of the 9th, as soon as the mist lifted a little, our batteries 
opened fire at about half-past 6 o’clock. The Russians were unprepared, 
and for some time did not reply, and then but slowly. The fire of the 
Allies during this day inflicted immense damage on the principal 
works of the enemy ; but so great was his energy, and so vast were the 
resources of the fortress, that in spite of the continuous fire during 
the night from the mortars J in the English batteries, by the following 
morning the whole of his works were repaired and re-armed. 
With regard to this point, it must be borne in mind that the Russians 
had their arsenal and ships of war close at hand, and their communi¬ 
cations with their works were so good, as compared with the position 
of the Allies to their depots, that these duties were far less laborious 
to them than to their adversaries. Still it is true that the constant shell 
fire by night was a very disturbing element and the work of the 
Russian very praiseworthy. 
At this stage of the bombardment we come to the episode to which we 
wish to draw attention. For reasons already stated, the advanced 
batteries 7 and 8 were not armed when the cannonade began on the 
9th, but during the night of the 11th, by most strenous exertions, four 
of the five 32-prs. detailed for the armament of No. 7 battery were got 
into position by a fatigue party, under Captain 01dershaw,§ and here, 
as an instance of the difficulties to be contended with, it may be 
mentioned that since the afternoon of the 8th, a period of seventy-two 
hours, the Royal Artillery had had but two reliefs, and in consequence, 
both officers and men were becoming exhausted from their exertions 
and over-work. However, the battery being armed, it was manned at 
1 o’clock on the morning of the 12th by a party under 2nd Captain Lukin || 
and Lieutenant Hall,IT but with orders from Captain Oldfield** not to 
* Kane’s List, No. 2010. 
t Kane’s List, No. 2432. 
j There were forty-one mortars of 13,10 and 8 inch at this time in the two Attacks.— 
Morning Reports of Attacks. 
§ Kane’s List, No. 2337, now Major-General C. E. Oldershaw, C.B. 
|| Kane’s List, No. 2170, now Major-General VV. W. Lukin. 
% Kane’s List, No. 2404, Colonel W. J. Hall, died May 21st, 1896. 
** Kane’s List, No. 1879, Captain A. Oldfield was killed in the batteries before 
Sebastopol, August 17th, 1855. 
