534 
SIEGE OF SEBASTOPOL. 
“Colonel Dacres will be so good as to communicate with Captains Henry 
and Walcott, and express to them not only my approval of their conduct, 
and that of the Officers and Men under them, but my warmest thanks 
for their gallantry and steady perseverance in the discharge of their 
duty.” 
Sd., Raglan. 
The Officers referred to are as follows :— 
2nd Captain Oldershaw. Lieutenant Simpson. 
„ „ P. Dickson. „ Torriano. 
„ „ Lukin. „ Harris. 
„ Briscoe. 
“ By order. 
John Adye, # Lieut.-Colonel, a.a.g.R.a.” 
After the experience of the 13th and 14th, it was clear that although 
receiving every support from the batteries in rear, the advanced batteries 
could no longer now be used to any good purpose ; they were reduced 
to a state of ruin, and were therefore ordered not again to be manned 
during the April bombardment.! 
The fighting on these two days was a success for the enemy, and was 
so considered by them. Todleben ascribes it to the fire from Bastion, 
No. 3, which he says “ continued to fight with success against the 
English,” yet it would seem from what we can gather, that that work, 
and its adjacent batteries, mostly directed their fire on No. 8, while it 
was the Town and Garden batteries that were principally engaged with 
No. 7, but however that may be, those who contended with the Russian 
Artillerymen and Sailors on this and other occasions, fully recognised 
the skill and resoluteness of their opponents. 
The bombardment lasted until the 19th, when the fire was gradually 
discontinued. The casualties in the English army during these ten 
days were 265. Among the personnel and materiel of the Left Attack 
siege train, the loss amounted to: killed 13, wounded 25, guns disabled 15, 
damaged 11. J That the loss was so small, must be attributed in a great 
measure, to the skilful manner in which the parallels and boyaux were 
layed out, and to the sound substantial work in the construction of the 
batteries and magazines by the Engineers, and also to the fact that the 
projectile principally used by the Russians was round shot; had they 
used a larger proportion of shell, especially on the 13th and 14th, 
matters might have been very different. The question of casualties 
with them, was much more serious. Compelled from the constant 
expection of an assault to keep the troops covering their works close at 
hand, they were continually exposed to a deadly fire, which, during 
these ten days, resulted in a loss of upwards of 6000 men. That no 
assault at this period of the siege was attempted, must be set down to 
the influence of the Emperor of the French, who desired to modify the 
plan of campaign as hitherto followed. He advocated placing a field 
army in the Crimea, which should sever the communications between 
Sebastopol and the interior, believing that such an arrangement would 
* Kane’s List, No. 1891. Now General Sir John Adye, g.c.b. 
f At a future date, it may be possible to follow the fortunes of these batteries through 
other parts of the siege.— (f.A.w.) 
% From the Morning States of the Left Attack, between the 10th and 20th April, 
1855 .—(F.A.W.) 
