50 
THE ERENCH SOUDAN. 
on with the admirable and seasoned troops which he had in hand, and 
to fall on his ancient enemy Samory, whose attitude gave cause for some 
disquietude. 
There has been no little discussion on the subject of this commence¬ 
ment of hostilities against the Almamy of Bissandougou, and consider¬ 
able criticism has been directed against the conditions and opportunity 
under which active operations were recommenced in this direction. 
Had he been left to himself Samory might have continued to remain at 
peace with the French. Thus, notwithstanding the invitations which 
he had received from Ahmadou, he had always rejmained on good 
terms with the French authorities. Certainly, when Captain Binger 
met him in 1888, at the siege of Sikasso, where he tried to conquer 
Tieba, an ally of the French, he did not evince any great haste 
in executing his engagements, and even refused to acknowledge 
that hardy explorer. But it is necessary to take into consideration 
the character of these Africans, and the proof that Samory did not 
wish to make war against the French is that he concluded at Niako, 
on the 13th February, 1889, with Captain Bounardot, a treaty in 
which he abandoned all his possessions on the left bank of the Niger 
to the French. This agreement isolated the territories of Samory 
from those of the Fouta-Djalon and from Sierra Leone, enabliug the 
French to open up a route from the upper Niger to French Guinea and 
the coast. Those who were interested in embroiling the French with 
the Almamy hastened to point out to that chief how the concessions he 
had made to the French would prevent his'easily buying cattle from 
the Foutankas, and powder from the British traders of Sierra Leone. 
In consequence, Samory, within less than three months, sent back the 
treaty he had just signed. Steps were at once taken to induce him to 
reconsider his decision, and he was given to understand that war 
would be the result of such an insult to France. Nothing, however, 
came of these attempts, Samory listened to the council of those who 
advised him to resist; his Sofas 1 were well armed with rifles, and he 
prepared for war by now accepting the propositions of Ahmadou, with 
a view to simultaneous action. 
Upon this Colonel Achinnrd determined at once to begin active 
operations as follows :—An expeditionary column marched out from 
Nyamina on the 8th March, 1891, and proceeding along the left bank 
of the Niger ascended to the neighbourhood of Siguiri. On the 2nd 
April, the French crossed the river, and on the 7th occupied Kankan, 
a stronghold of Samory, situated some 80 kilometres from the Niger 
in the valley of the Milo, which the Almamy had shortly before aban¬ 
doned after setting the place on fire. 
Colonel Achinard, leaving a garrison here in order to construct a 
post, without delay, proceeded on up the valley of the Milo. On the 
the 8th April a fight, at which Samory himself was present, took place 
in the ravine of Kokouna, at some distance to the south of Kankan. 
Twelve or thirteen hundred Sofas were in position at this locality and 
the battle was hotly contested, the French losses being considerable. 
Nevertheless, the Africans were forced to beat a retreat, leaving on 
1 Sofas, i.e., marabouts or dervishes, Mahomedan fanatics. 
