80 
OKEHAMPTON EXPERIENCES, 1893. 
in that enormous concentration of artillery that won the battle there. Most of 
the artillery of the 10th, 12th, and the Guards, about 240 guns in all, * 1 concen¬ 
trated against Canrobert’s Corps which had little more than half its proper 
complement of artillery, not more than 56 guns in all. It not only produced an 
overwhelming effect, but from the position of the woods and the fall of the 
ground this artillery was not exposed to the fire of the French artillery along the 
remainder in the position. Throughout the whole of the remainder of the posi¬ 
tion the German artillery was numerically inferior to the French, and without 
that numerical inferiority the superiority at the decisive point of 8t. Privat could 
not have been gained. Very likely in consequence of the remainder of the 
French guns being comparatively less fired upon than the others the Germans 
sustained a greater amount of loss than they would otherwise have done, 2 but 
you must sustain some loss, you cannot make omelettes without breaking eggs, 
and if you are going to get artillery into such a position as to gain the point 
that is ultimately to decide the fate of the battle you can only do it by taking 
your chance of losses at other points where the issue will not be decisive. 
Then I come to the question of the different authorities that are cited by Major 
White. I cannot go through them all, but that anyone like my friend Major Hughes 
should possibly have been able to read over this article of Major White’s and sup¬ 
pose that these citations of authority represented the purpose for which they are 
quoted is to me an amazement. Let me give you one, “ Hoffbauer makes a 
similar allusion when discussing the battle of Gravelotte,” that is supposed to be 
defending the principle of “ distribution ” in what I should call the sense of “ dis¬ 
persion ”—that is the use of gun for gun—in this paragraph, “ The artillery 
of the 1st Army now formed a mass of 26 batteries, 156 guns in all. The 
Commanding Officers were careful to concentrate the fire on the most important 
points wherever this was necessary or had not already been done.” Now how 
that is put forward as a proof that the Germans did not concentrate is to me one 
of the mysteries of language. I hope I have made it clear to you. This is 
quoted as an illustration that the Germans did not concentrate—that they were 
on the side of what is called “distribution.” 3 There is a certain other use of 
the term “ distribution ” in Major White’s article to which I have no objection 
whatever, provided it is not used to cover this gun for gun theory. When we 
speak of concentrating on a position he says it must not be against a mathe¬ 
matical point. It never occurred to me that misunderstanding was possible. I 
am supposing such a concentration of guns as took place against St. Privat. 
Certainly St. Privat was quite a small enough object for that number of guns, 
« ■ 
1 The Prussian Official namesonly 192 guns as actually employed against St. Privat prior to the 
final attack, hut more than 240 must have been in one way or the other engaged in this part of 
the field, because, in addition to the artillery of the three Corps, part of the 9th Corps artillery 
was also used. 
2 As a matter-of-fact, the Germans had much the worst of it everywhere else but on the extreme 
right of the French position till that was carried. 
3 I must do Major "White the justice to say that I did not realise the purpose for which he 
made this quotation. Anyone, however, who will refer to the passage, Hoffbauer p. 240, will'see 
that the statement about the Germans having previously established their superiority is in no way 
whatever put as the reason for the concentration, but is a mere subsequent record of the situation at 
the time. The previous citation from Hoffbauer in Major White’s paper in the United Service 
Magazine has nothing to do with thesubject. Hoffbauer’s object in it is to assert the value under 
certain circumstances of very long ranges. I quoted in my lecture from the Prussian Official and 
from Hoffbauer case after case where the Prussians had gained success by concentrated fire long 
before any superiority had been obtained. Hoffbauer everywhere records the success of concen¬ 
tration. “ In this battle, c Gravelotte,’ the principle of employing artillery in masses was carried 
out from the very commencement ,” p. 323. Much more important as regards the point of issue 
are the numerous instances he gives, such as this, “ the artillery mass of the left wing, which fired 
on the French columns advancing in support and drew upon itself the fire of the enemy’s artil¬ 
lery f p. 138, not, therefore, as a preliminary subdued, and not. making the use of the artillery 
impossible on that account, though in greatly superior strength to the German artillery. 
