Dkehampton experiences/ 1893 . 
83 
the authority of one of the best technical writers, who says, as quoted by me in 
that paper from which Colonel Maurice has read. “ A tactical regulation of tire 
was then existent, a technical one such as is in the present day necessary . 
was not acknowledged ” (Yon Eohne “ Kegulation of Eire in Masses of Artil¬ 
lery. 55 ) We all know the great concentration of guns at the battle of Worth. 
People talk of this concentration and come to the conclusion that the Germans 
concentrated the fire of all these guns on one point and swept up and down till 
they had silenced their opponent’s batteries. That was not the case. Although 
the German accounts do not mention what the distribution of the fire was, others 
do. The French accounts do. The French had nothing to be ashamed of ; they 
had no reason to minimise their defeat; they made a good fight against enormous 
odds and they are proud of it. One of the best accounts was that of de Chains 
(himself an artillery officer and likely to notice these things), he says that at 
10 o’clock the German artillery, although the artillery duel was at its height, 
was firing at everything on the ground. It was fire from a concentrated mass 
of guns, and the fire was concentrated on the tactical point, the Elsassliausen 
Plateau, I admit, but it was concentrated on a particular point, it was not 
even confined to the artillery; therefore it was not the technical concentration 
that Colonel Maurice apparently thinks it was■•“ The enemy fired not only 
at our batteries, but also at the infantry and the cavalry wherever any targets 
were presented by them. 5 ’ 1 At 10.30 the Prussians continued to fire at all 
points where they saw troops, and again at 12.30 they were still at the same 
game. Therefore when you read of concentration of fire in the campaign of 
1870—71 it is as well to bear in mind that they did not apply then what I 
should call technical concentrations on certain points. As to firing over the 
whole line that bears upon us I think that is absolutely necessary. I cannot 
agree with Colonel Maurice as he said in'another paper, £C As to the fear that 
other guns will fire at me with appalling effect because they are not being fired 
at at all, and they can, therefore, range on more at their leisure, is, like the other, 
a peace nightmare. 55 
Personally I should prefer not to be fired at, as I think I should make much 
better shooting if I were not. Gentlemen, that is my defence of the views I 
put forward. May I refer back to the quotation from Hoffbauer that Colonel 
Maurice read out ? He said that my quotation was that the German batteries 
concentrated their fire upon the position as they considered necessary, but Colonel 
Maurice omitted the last sentence, in which the gist of the whole lies, which was — 
“ The German guns had previously established their great superiority over the 
enemy’s artillery. 55 This makes all the difference in the world to the sense of 
the quotation. They had established their great superiority over the French, and, 
therefore, they could do practically what they pleased. 
As we are taught that the very soul of defence is a counter-attack, I should 
like to say something about the views that Colonel Maurice has - put forward on 
the question of concentration and avoidance in a very interesting article on 
“ Nelson and Pitt. 55 The theory is based first of all upon the action of Nelson 
in naval actions • that he concentrated his fire upon a certain portion of the 
enemy’s line and practically annihilated it. To begin with, that seems to me not 
to apply, because Nelson first of all had to manoeuvre for the weather gauge 
which practically put half his enemy’s line out of action. And, again, it does 
not apply because ships while manoeuvring can fire, and while we are .manoeuvring 
we are worse than useless, for we cannot fire ; at least, until we are provided with 
movable platforms, such as were used by the Nawab’s guns at the battle of 
Plassey. 
Avoidance must be connected with manoeuvre. It is rather suggestive of your 
1 " Froeschwiller de Chains,’ 5 p. 95. 
