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chanzy’s campaign. 
Bourbaki, by going against the communications up towards Paris, on 
the east thereof, would otherwise seriously embarrass the Germans. It 
is hard to say who is to blame for the failure of that idea. Certainly 
not General Chanzy 1 ; certainly not General Bourbaki—possibly the 
Central Government, and more than probably the condition of the 
army: bad officers and ill trained men; because, of course, the mass 
of the officers of the regular army were now in Germany— 400,000 
regular soldiers, after the capitulation of Sedan on the 1st September, 
and the capitulation of Metz on the 27th October, were in Germany 
itself, and there was no tried system of organisation available. 
We have had two phases of Chanzy's arrangements. First, as 
significant of his qualities as a Corps Commander of the 16th, and then 
as an army leader, fighting obstinately for three days, stopping an 
army flushed with victory, and who expected nothing less than a fight— 
stopping them at the positions between the forest of Marchenoir and 
Beaugency. I wish I had time to give details; I have them here, and, 
if permitted, perhaps I may supply them later on, but I have not 
time at present. The next thing is his flank march whereby, from 
looking north he looked east on the right rear of the men who 
were attacking him a few days before ; that is to say, his proceedings, 
December 11th to 12th, the very clever flank retreat by the French to 
the Loir, and the occupation of the good position at Freteval. 
The next feature is the retreat of the French army to Le Mans, and 
the fourth and final phase is the battle at Le Mans. 
Now, why did he retreat to Le Mans—from the Loir to Le Mans ? 
Well, some writers say for strategic reasons : that the further he drew 
these Germans west the greater portion of France he left open to the 
operations of such other levies as Gambetta could organise. That is 
quite clear. If he had that strategic idea in his mind well and good, 
but it does not appear from his own book that he was influenced by it 
only. 
The German official account, 2 is a monumental book, but an exceed¬ 
ingly difficult book, and a book burdened with details and utterly 
lacking in narrative power. I am sorry its translation should be used 
as a text-book in England, because I do not believe that even in 
Germany it is used for ordinary study—I believe it is used as a book 
of reference ; but it does not appear to me that it was necessary for the 
information of Englishmen to set forth every single detail of all the 
German proceedings at every one of these battles—each company, each 
battery, and so on, although, of course, there may be something to be 
said for this, in so far as the original was written for Germans. Mean¬ 
time I cannot discover in the least from its pages what was the real 
motive of action of Chanzy; but I think his own book, although he 
does not tell the motive—perhaps for some subtle reason—will explain 
his movements. It was absolutely necessary to get some place in 
which these young levies might be further organised, re-dressed, fed 
1 In the Appendix will be found several of Chanzy’s powerful letters quoted in their entirety. 
2 I quite admit with Captain Grierson that for Germans all the details of the official account are 
valuable, but it seems unreasonable to ask English officers to learn by heart much more about 
German battalions at Gravelotte or St. Quentin than they know about English battalions at Vit- 
toria or Waterloo, 
