96 
CHANZY S CAMPAIGN. 
exclusively to bear the burden of the struggle”—in point of fact, 
the German cavalry did very little at all; the only cavalry that did 
much was the 14th Cavalry Brigade (Schmidt's) of the 6th Cavalry 
Division: “ It follows that in such country, the control of the higher 
Commanders is rendered very difficult, and that independent initiative 
must be demanded ol every leader.” I do not know how far you will 
be inclined to apply those remarks, taken from the German official 
account, to the circumstances of your own country in the event of 
invasion. It might be a good lesson to try, for the several arms could 
be handled between Dover and London step by step. 
Now, how the Germans, thus hampered by the nature of the country, 
by snowdrifts, sometimes by fogs, by mitrailleuses and by infantry, 
managed to advance at all is the next question. Another peculiar 
point of this campaign was the limited length of the day available for 
marching. Some people ridicule the Germans because they only went 
40 miles between the 6th and the 10th, in fact less than 40 miles; but 
then they had not the whole day for the march; they could not begin 
till the forenoon was far advanced. Why ? Because it was utterly 
impossible to bivouac—the weather was so exceedingly bad. I do not 
know whether you were in this part of the world at the time, but I was, 
and I remember it very well, and I thought it was probably the severest 
weather that I ever went through—that December and that January. 
The Germans could not possibly let their troops bivouac, and, according, 
each night they managed to find shelter somewhere, and therefore 
they had to march from the fighting ground, as it were, to the sleeping 
ground, and then in the morning they had to march back again from 
the sleeping places to the fighting places. And this was in January in 
a very bad year, and practically the work or the actions would begin, 
say, at 11 o'clock and would end between 3 and 4 o'clock. There is 
an account by a distinguished British officer of what he saw one 
mid-day, and if you will allow me I will read it, because I cannot pre¬ 
tend to give as good a description from my second or, 1 should say, 
third hand information as this gentleman did who was through all the 
campaign. We are now on (pointing to a map) the 8th of January. 
You will see the routes yourselves from (1) Vendome to St. Calais, 
St. Calais to Bouloire, Bouloire to Le Mans; (2) La Chartre, Chateau 
Du Loir, Luce, Ecommoy; (3) Illiers, Authon, Bernard La Ferte— 
such were the lines of the different columns. I may tell you that the 
18th Division practically became the reserve of the 3rd Corps. Another 
thing that will show you how difficult it must have been is that on this 
analysis at the right of the hand-map, you will see a number of engage¬ 
ments, and they are not one-half of the actions of each day: “Imagine 
a straight road” (says this English officer in his account) “leading 
over a succession of round hills; on either side of it a rich country, 
dotted with farm-houses, cottages, orchards and walled gardens, hedges 
(exactly like those of England), and occasional woods. In fact, Kent 
and Surrey combined, with vineyards instead of hop gardens, would be 
an exact picture of the country through which the Germans were 
pushing on, under all the disadvantage of the fog, in a land never seen 
before” (and which I suppose they never wish to see again). “The 
