122 
THE FRENCH SOUDAN. 
fectly well acquainted with the serious position of affairs in the French 
Soudan, and since Colonel Humbert had expressed his desire of retiring 
from the command, the direction of affairs in the Soudan was confided 
to Colonel Archinard. 
It was decided that, except under certain urgent conditions, the 
senior commandant in the Soudan should not take personal command 
of the troops, and that the direction of the active operations should be 
given to Colonel Combes, who was appointed to the command of the 
Soudanese native regiment now newly organised. Besides, Captain 
Quiquandon, lately promoted Commandant, was sent on a mission to 
Tieba to counteract the influence of that chiefs councillors, who were 
endeavouring to persuade him to take up arms against the French. 
In fact, the Colonial Secretary now gave to the French Soudan a 
political autonomy, a necessary consequence of the administrative 
autonomy which had existed since 1887. It w 7 as under these new con¬ 
ditions that the campaign of 1892-93 commenced. 
The task of Colonel Combes, in charge of the projected operations 
against Samory, was not only to fight that old adversary of the French 
and to beat that chief out of the field, it was more especially to isolate 
completely the territories which he governed both from Sierra Leone, 
on one side, whence he could procure breech-loading and magazine 
rifles and ammunition through the British traders, and, on the other 
side, from the Fouta Djallon, where he was able to exchange his 
prisoners as slaves in exchange for oxen and provisions. 
The map which accompanies this paper makes in fairly easy to follow 
the line of French operations against Samory, and from inspection the 
reader will be able to understand how 7 , in order to carry out his pro¬ 
gramme, it was necessary for Colonel Combes to occupy the valley of 
the Upper Niger, and to construct there one or more posts up the 
river from Kouroussa, which hitherto had been the most advanced of 
the French posts in this direction. 
In this high valley of the Niger, for some time past, one of Samorjds 
best and most active Lieutenants had been operating, by name “ the 
old Bilali ”—a name given to distinguish him from his sons, also chiefs 
of the Sofas—who, in concert with Tenesso-Koba, another subordinate 
chief, under the direct orders of the Almamy guarded the provinces 
of Kouranko, Sankaran, and Kissi. The old Bilali was the delegate 
of Samory in his trade for arms and cattle with Sierra Leone and 
the Fouta Djalon. It was he who, in 1890-91, had laid waste the 
territories which separate Sierra Leone from the Fouta Djallon, terri¬ 
tories recognised by Great Britain as lying within the sphere of French 
influence. It was this same chief who made this country impassable 
for those who wished to pass from French Guinea into the valley of 
the Niger. The missions of Brosselard and Faidherbe in 1890, and of 
Lamadon in 1891, were thus forced to return to the Atlantic coast 
without being able to penetrate to the south-west of the French Soudan. 
The occupation of the High Niger Valley was, therefore, necessary in 
order to drive out the marauding bands of Bilali, and to permit the 
establishment of a fresh road of communication between the great 
river and the Atlantic, 
