SAUGOR, C.P.—A STORY OP 1857 . 
161 
not possess a single one of these advantages: that is, on the Artillery 
Hill we should have nothing of the necessaries of life, we should have 
no water and should command nothing, and those who were fortunate 
enough to reach the place after an outbreak occurred, for the re¬ 
tirement thereto of the European officers and others was only to be 
effected subsequent thereto, could not possibly hold out beyond two or 
three days, in the absence of food and water, and surrounded as we 
should be by nearly 3000 mutineers and any number of bad characters 
and possibly rebels from the immediate neighbourhood, who would be 
sure to flock into cantonments for the sake of plunder, &c. The position 
in cantonments (see Plan A.) occupied by the Native Infantry regiments 
■ would have enabled them to cut off from the Artillery Hill almost the 
whole of the European portion of the community who resided in the 
detached houses scattered about the place. Brigadier Sage at once 
-acknowledged the truth of my argument, and ordered me, in company 
with Captain (now Major-General) Marshall, to inspect the Artillery 
Hill on the following morning (23rd June, 1857), and each of us to 
forward to him a separate confidential report on its defensibility as a 
military position. Captain Marshall and I accordingly proceeded to 
the Artillery Hill on the morning in question, and although as a mem¬ 
ber of the Council of War Captain Marshall was in favour of a 
retirement to the Artillery Hill in the event of an outbreak, he arrived 
at the same decision as myself, viz., that the Artillery Hill was at the 
time, and under then existing circumstances, utterly indefensible as 
a military position, and we returned to our respective homes. I 
presume Captain Marshall submitted his report. Mine was at once 
written and forwarded the same day (23rd June) again pointing out 
the advantages and disadvantages of either position, that is, of the fort 
and Artillery Hill, and added that, as the Brigadier was fully aware 
Jfrom the reports of spies, &c. that an outbreak was merely hanging fire, 
I strongly impressed upon him that it would be the wisest policy to act 
beforehand and anticipate the intending mutineers by at once occupying 
the fort. Our situation at Saugor without the fort was simply hope¬ 
less, for there was no station with European troops within hundreds of 
miles, even if they would have been available, so that whatever was to 
he done to hold the place and to save our lives must be done by our¬ 
selves. 
I mentioned at the opening of this narrative that I had proceeded to 
Saugor, and I may say that the object of my journey was in order to 
take over charge of the magazine (Arsenal) there, from the Madras 
Ordnance Department, on the transfer of the Saugor District to the 
Bengal Presidency. The European portion of the Madras Ordnance 
Department at Saugor consisted of nine warrant and non-commissioned 
officers, and at the time I am writing off, I had only six Europeans of 
the same class belonging to the Bengal Ordnance Department, forming 
in the aggregate 15 Europeans who worked in the magazine daily for 
eight hours: during the remaining 16 hours the fort and magazine were 
in the entire charge of a guard of Native Infantry about 30 strong. 
On the 24th June, 1857, Brigadier Sage sent for me and personally 
ordered me into the fort, and also the European warrant and non- 
