GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1894 . 
341 
(2.) When both sides are on the move, either witli a view of 
mutual attack, or when one seeks to attack while the other 
is anxious to avoid or postpone an engagement. The first 
of these produces what is called a premeditated, the second 
what is called an accidental battle. In either case, ulti¬ 
mately, one attacks and the other defends. The conditions ^Conditions^ 
under which the deployments for attack would take place battles take 
are, however, very different. Acting on the above assump- place- 
tion, it is proposed to investigate some tactical schemes for 
exercising artillery in the part they would probably be 
called on to play in such engagements. At present we 
shall devote our attention exclusively to the consideration 
of the premeditated battle, postponing the consideration 
of the accidental one until we come to deal with tbe sub¬ 
ject of artillery manoeuvres with other arms. 
In the conduct of all kinds of manoeuvres, the general principles genera^ 
which we propose for guidance are those most salient in the tactical for guidance 
exercises, initiated at Aldershot by Sir Evelyn Wood, for the practical at iery rtl1 " 
training of artillery in large bodies, and which, we venture to think, manoeuvres, 
owed much of their success to two main features :— 
(1.) The secrecy which was preserved as to time, place, and the 
nature of exercise. 
(2.) The careful selection of suitable ground as little known as 
possible. 
We have thus, thanks to his foresight, avoided the pitfalls against 
which a Swiss officer warns his countrymen in a recent article (trans¬ 
lated by General Goodenough, in the January number of the Pro¬ 
ceedings of the United Service Institution”). In this he states that 
owiug to want of secrecy with regard to the operations, not only were Result of 
their manoeuvres rendered useless, but that the effect produced was secrecy with 
actually pernicious, as there was a tendency towards the creation of ”*5$^° 
critics rather than men of action. The difficulties of representing the exercises, 
conditions of war in time of peace are so great, that we cannot afford 
to neglect an opportunity which gives the power of, to some extent, 
testing such qualities as quick insight and rapid decision. 
The principles which we propose are, then :— 
(1.) That all information concerning an exercise about to be per¬ 
formed should be kept secret. Any laxity with regard Secrecy, 
to this point having the effect of depriving it of all value 
for anything but drill purposes. 
( 2 .) That the senior officer present should assume the part of Director of 
director of manoeuvres, draw out the plan of operations, “orchfof 3 
nominate the officers to command and direct the compilation um P ire - 
of the critique on the day^s proceedings; but should take 
no part in the actual command, being present in the posi¬ 
tion of chief umpire or spectator. When this is not the 
case and the senior officer assumes command little is gained, 
as in the first place he cannot criticise his own procedure, 
46 
