354 
SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1894 . 
Two assump¬ 
tions will be 
made. The 
first 
assumption 
is that the 
battery is 
the fire unit 
of Artillery. 
The question 
of the 
tactical unit 
will be dealt 
with later on. 
The second 
assumption 
is that the 
primary 
object of the 
tactics of 
massed bat¬ 
teries is to 
secure the 
concentra¬ 
tion of their 
fire. 
but the inquiry need not be the less free for this cause, and it is reason¬ 
able to hope that the very fact of its being so free will render it more 
helpful to those who are interested in the study of modern artillery 
tactics. 
Before proceeding with the detailed discussion of the subject of the 
Essay, it will be necessary to make two assumptions which the experi¬ 
ence of the past has placed beyond the limits of controversy. It will 
be assumed in the first place that the statement made in the opening 
paragraph of this paper as to the battery of six guns being the fire unit 
of Horse and Field Artillery is accepted as an accomplished fact. 1 2 
Five years ago this fact was not so clearly recognised. In the “ In¬ 
structions for Practice,” issued in 1888, a system was laid down by 
means of which the Brigade Division Commander was required to carry 
out the executive process, known as “ ranging 33 collectively for all the 
batteries under his command. This being found to be impracticable, 
the system was discontinued in 1889. From that date the battery has 
been always regarded as the fire unit, and all subsequent modifications 
in Fire Discipline training have been in the direction of emphasising 
its autonomy as such. 
How far the battery when acting in combination with others is also 
to be regarded as the tactical unit will be a matter for inquiry later on 
in this paper. To find a solution to this question would seem to have 
been one of the objects in view of the Committee in selecting the 
present subject for discussion. It is not, therefore, proposed to antici¬ 
pate any conclusions which may be arrived at hereafter until the 
arguments bearing on the question have been fully examined. This 
part of the Essay is merely meant to serve as a preface to the other 
parts, and is written to introduce rather than discuss the subject 
which will be considered hereafter from the different points of view 
under which it presents itself to the mind. 
The second assumption is that the primary object of the tactics of 
massed batteries of artillery is to ensure the simultaneous concentration 
of their fire on a given point, at a given time, and in obedience to the 
will of a siugle commander. This cardinal principle of modern artil¬ 
lery tactics was first taught by Napoleon, and subsequently used against 
him by the Allied Powers 3 when they had learnt the secret of his 
victories. “ Since the time of Napoleon,” wrote the author of the 
“Tactical Ketrospect,” 3 in 1866, “the concentration of great masses 
1 “ The ranging of a battery and the conduct of its fire will be left entirely in the hands of the 
Battery Commander.” “ Field Artillery Drill,” 1893. 
Regarding the number of guns in a battery, Napoleon organised his batteries with eight guns, 
for the reason (given by himself) that this number afforded facilities for subdividing the battery. 
In his days guns, when once in action, were fought individually, and not collectively, by the 
Battery Commander. There is a consensus of agreement now as to six being the correct number 
of guns for a battery. A recent writer remarks as follows on this point:—“ It is found as a matter 
of practical experience in action that with a 4-gun battery there are pauses in the fire after every 
four rounds. With an 8-gun battery it is generally found that there are two guns loaded and 
waiting for their turn to fire, consequently wasting time. With a 6-gun battery there are no 
pauses, and every gun is doing its full work without hurry and without waste of time.” ‘‘Field 
Artillery Fire.” By Captain W. L. White, R.A. 
2 When Napoleon saw the great artillery masses of the Allied armies at Leipzig, he cried 
angrily: “ At last they have learnt something.” 
2 “ TacJctische Riickblicke at(fl866,” translated from the German by Col. H. A. Ouvry, C.B. 
