SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1894 . 
355 
of artillery has become an axiom/ 5 It was not the denial of the princi¬ 
ple which led to the effacement of the Prussian artilllery in the war 
with Austria, but the faulty means which were taken to give effect 
to its practice. 1 British artillerymen first learnt its truth at the battle 
ofVittoria, 2 and the lesson was not thrown away at Waterloo. 3 It 
was forgotten during the long years of peace which preceded the 
Crimean War, with the result that the artillery only took a feeble part 
in the hard won victory of the Alma. The value of the Arm underwent 
a corresponding degree of depreciation until the successes of the Ger¬ 
man Artillery in 1870 restored it to the place it occupied under Napoleon. 
All modern artillery drill-books 4 5 now base their manoeuvre formations 
upon the recognition of this principle, which is universally received as 
an axiom of artillery tactics. 
By the acceptance of the foregoing assumptions, the problem which Two definite 
remains to be solved becomes narrowed down to two clear and definite lssues ' 
issues. Firstly, what is the best tactical organisation for securing the 
maximum number of batteries being brought into action at the right 
time and right place ? This question will be considered in Part II. of 
this Essay. Secondly, having fixed the organisation, what is the best 
system of training for utilising this organisation, not only for the tactical 
purpose of bringing massed batteries into the field, but in order to secure 
the maintenance of superior control while they are in action ? This 
second question will be dealt with in Part III. of the Essay. The sub¬ 
ject will then be considered generally (Part IY.) in some concluding 
reflections. 
PART II. 
Tactical Organisation. 
“ Field Artillery is organised by Batteries, and manoeuvres by Brigade- 
Bivisions .” 5 
The first question which suggests itself for consideration is, What is what is the 
the tactical unit of Horse and Field Artillery ? The answer to this ^HorLand 
question must depend upon what interpretation is placed on the ex- 
1 These faults are summarised by Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe Ingelfingen as follows :— 
(1.) Unwillingness to employ masses of artillery to prepare the action. 
(2.) Palse plan of holding a Reserve Artillery in hand. 
(3.) Guns were kept too far to the rear in the columns of route. 
(4.) Slow pace of marching.—“ Letters on Artillery,” translated by Major H. L. Walford, 
R. A. 
2 The fact that the concentration of 90 British guns was due to accident rather than to design 
does not detract from the value of the lesson learnt. 
3 At Waterloo 18 batteries of English, German, and Hanoverian Artillery were concentrated in a 
space of about 3000 yards. The whole of the Reserve Artillery was brought into action before 
1.30 p.m. 
4 “ It is important to be able to develop a superior number of guns from the very outset, and to 
produce a mass effect at an early period.” “Drill Regulations of the German Field Artillery,” 
1892, translated by Captain W. A. Macbean, R.A. 
“It is essential that the artillery should be used in masses of the greatest strength available. 
In. order to produce its full effect the fire of artillery must be concentrated.” “ Field Artillery 
Drill,” 1893. 
5 “ Skill-at-Arms,” by Lieut.-General Sir W. J. Williams, K.C.B., R.A., “Proceedings,” 
R.A.I., September, 1892. 
