356 
SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1894 . 
The battery 
of six guns is 
the tactical 
unit. 
German 
teaching on 
this point. 
Example of 
the Franco- 
German 
War. 
pression “ tactical unit.” If it be sought to ascertain what is the 
greatest number of guns that can be led and fought by the hand and 
voice of one commander, then the answer points to the battery, and to 
the battery only, as fulfilling this condition. The executive personal com¬ 
mand of three or even two batteries under modern tactical conditions 
is not within the reach of human possibility. A commander may make 
his voice heard throughout a Brigade Division of three batteries when 
halted in rendezvous formation, but as soon as the batteries deploy for 
manoeuvre oral control ceases to be possible. 
The right conception of a tactical unit seems to be that it should be able 
to manoeuvre and fight at all times under the direct personal leadership 
of its commander. 1 The single battery does do this. Massed batteries 
do not. “ A battery moves as a whole into a new position.” 2 It is 
personally led by its commander while moving, and personally fought 
by him while in action. The officers and men look to their battery 
leader as the source of all their actions. It is his voice and his signal 
which they watch for and obey. What takes place between him and 
his superior does not enter their thoughts. They have no eyes and no 
ears beyond their own Commanding Officer. “ The battery is the unit 
of artillery. All other organisation is accidental. It is by batteries 
that artillerymen make war.” 3 
The teaching of the German Artillery Drill Regulations is very clear 
on this point. While enjoining simultaneous action on the part of all 
the batteries of the Brigade Division, the necessity of developing the 
tactical initiative of each Battery Commander is strongly insisted on. 
In advancing into position it is laid down that “ Identical procedure on 
the part of all the batteries is uncalled for” 4 —the main consideration to 
be kept uppermost in mind being the importance of taking advantage of 
cover. When the Brigade Division halts behind the fighting position 
previous to coming into action, the orders are that “ each battery is to 
form up as its commander may direct.” 5 After the Battery Commanders 
have been called up to receive their orders from the Brigade Division 
Commander as to target and ground allotted to their batteries, they are 
thenceforward required to act for themselves. “ They settle how 
they will lead their batteries into action, upon the position of the first 
line of wagons, and upon the number of wagons to be called up to 
the battery.” 6 Both the letter and the spirit of the above quoted regu¬ 
lations demand from the battery leader that he should at all times be 
ready to assume the functions of an executive unit commander. 
The German drill-book is based on the practical experience of the 
campaign of 1870-71, and this fact invests it with an authority rising 
above other drill regulations, which are based only on theories deduced 
1 “ I know no better principle than the one I have mentioned, that the size of the units should 
be limited by the power of command of one man.”—“ Organisation of an Army for War.” Lec¬ 
ture bj Lieut.-General Sir E. Harrison, K.C.B., E.E., Aldershot Military Society, 3rd January, 
1889. 
2 “ Field Artillery Drill,” 1893. 
2 “ History of the Eoval Artillery,” by the late Colonel Duncan, E.A. 
4 “ Drill Regulations of the German Field Artillery,” 1892. 
^ Ibid. 
G Ibid. 
