SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY; 1894 . 
357 
from peace manoeuvres. A careful study of the artillery tactics in the 
principal battles of the Franco-German War shows that though organ¬ 
ised in Brigade Divisions and regiments, and though the chain of 
responsibility was habitually preserved from the superior Artillery 
Commander down to the battery leader, the actual moving into position 
was nearly always carried out by batteries working under the indepen¬ 
dent tactical leadership of their own commander. Throughout the 
war of 1870—71 wrote Prince Kraft in his now famous “ Letters on 
Artillery,” “ The brigades did not advance (with the sole exception of 
the movement of the 2nd Field Brigade at Sedan) into their position 
under the individual command of the Commander of the Brigade ; but 
one battery after another in succession, as they came up in column of 
route, moved up according to the orders sent to it by the Officer Com¬ 
manding the Brigade.” 
It is necessary to dwell on this point, because there has been a recent Tactics and 
tendency to misconstrue the spirit of German Artillery tactical teaching. 1 2 cannot 1 be 
It cannot be too clearly understood that the organisation of the German T s ^ a ^^ al 
Artillery has for its object to develop, subject to superior direction, the unit isident- 
necessary tactical initiative of the single battery. The German Artil- 1C fi r ™unit. he 
lery regulations give no sanction to the distinction which certain writers 
have recently drawn between shooting and tactics. 3 The German 
battery is the tactical unit as well as the fire unit, and this is no arbi¬ 
trary definition, but has been deduced from the practical experience of * 
a campaign which was mainly decided by the superior organisation 
and training of the German Artillery. Batteries are collected in 
Brigade Divisions, Brigade Divisions in Regiments, and Regiments in 
Corps Brigades, not in order to limit their required initiative, but to 
utilise to the utmost their combined power when massed in battle. The 
system does not relieve superior officers of responsibility, but rather 
increases their sense of it, and enables them to exercise their control 
by more certain, intelligent, and effective methods than were formerly 
used. “ A living organism has taken the place of a mechanical instru¬ 
ment.” 3 
Accepting the battery of six guns as the first unit of organisation, Tactical or. 
how should the units be combined for tactical purposes ? Napoleon g Artillery 0 
was the first general to organise his artillery with the object of securing Napoleon, 
the concentration of fire of massed batteries under “ one will.” The 
normal organisation of the Imperial Guard, 4 calculated at 40,000 men, 
was in four Infantry Divisions and one Cavalry Division. To this force 
1 Thus, an able writer, who has recently contributed a series of instructive articles to the “ Pro¬ 
ceedings ” of the Royal Artillery Institution, writes as follows somewhat regretfully of the 
British battery system :—“ In our service the battery is still regarded by the majority of officers as 
the unit, in whose leader are embraced all the functions, both of command and administration. 
The prerogative of the Major is still jealously guarded.” “Achievements of Field Artillery,” by 
Major E. S. May, E.A. 
2 _ Thus, Major White, E.A. remarks as follows :—“ The Brigade Division has become the tactical 
unit, and the battery the fighting unit.” “ Field Artillery Fire.” 
If German teaching be accepted as trustworthy, this sharp distinction seems hardly warrantable. 
3 “ War,” by Colonel J. F. Maurice, C.B., E.A. 
4 This organisation was subjected to various modifications according to fluctuations in the 
strength of the Guard. The organisation of the other corps of the Grand Army was assimilated 
to that of the Imperial Guard. 
48 
