SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1894. 
363 
the most elementary methods. “ Recalling my own experiences/ 5 
writes Prince Kraft, 1 2 “1 may add that in the three campaigns of 1866, 
1870, and 1871, the whole of my collected batteries never used any 
formation but the column of route and the advance in line. 55 
After precise drill comes manoeuvre training. The first necessity is Difference 
to ensure the prompt and correct transmission of orders from the DriiUnd 
Brigade Division Commander to the battery leaders and Ammunition Manoeuvre. 
Column. 3 4 In both the French and German Artillery the system of 
communicating orders by means of trained messengers ( agents de 
liaison) has been rendered very perfect during recent years. The 
Artillery Tactical Exercises, initiated by Sir Evelyn Wood at Aider- 
shot in 1890, impressed the necessity of this point on English Artillery 
Officers. Until these exercises were started there had been little 
systematic practice in manoeuvre tactics of Brigade Divisions. Great 
precision had been obtained in moving in close formation, deployments 
at a rapid pace from quarter-column, long advances of massed Brigade 
Divisions in line on open ground, and similar movements. Admirable 
as this practice was in teaching smartness, precision, and dexterity, it 
was, when unaccompanied by other instruction, an insufficient means of 
training batteries for their war functions. “ VArtillerie n } a qu’une 
tactique — le feu.” s It was only when Brigade Divisions were exercised 
as opposing forces or against a marked enemy with a concrete tactical 
situation 55 in mind that the difference between drill and manoeuvre as 
applied to artillery fighting became thoroughly understood. It was 
then discovered that the application of those evolutions, which had 
been taught on open ground in normal artillery positions, were imprac¬ 
ticable in the broken and intersected country selected by Sir Evelyn 
Wood for his artillery manoeuvres. A Brigade Division could not be 
led “ simultaneously and squarely 55 into the fighting position with its 
three batteries dressed precisely in line. After some useful failures, 
Commanding Officers had to fall back on the methods inculcated by 
Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe Ingelfingen, who lays it down as a general 
maxim derived from his own long experience of artillery fighting, that 
“ a brigade can be commanded in war only by means of instructions 
or orders to individual batteries, and under no circumstances by the 
actual word of command from the Officer Commanding. 554 
The adoption of this system of command necessitates the Brigade 
Division Commander being provided with adequate means for carrying 
it out. It has been suggested that for this purpose there should be a 
permanent establishment of non-commissioned officers and orderlies 
(including a Sergeant-Major and a Quarter-Master-Sergeant) on the 
Head-Quarter Staff of each Brigade Division. This seems unnecessary. 
Each battery being self-dependent in regard to administration and in¬ 
struction, and this being a cardinal principle of modern artillery organisa- 
1 “ Letters on Artillery.” 
2 “ Before going into action he will communicate with his Ammunition Column, and arrange the 
point at which it will be found during the combat.” “ Field Artillery Drill,” 1893. 
3 De Heusch. 
4 “ Betters on Artillery,” p. 377. Further on he writes : “ Much as I wish that artillery should 
be assimilated to the other arms, I yet consider it very undesirable that it should waste its time in 
practising evolutions which have nothing to do with its special duty as artillery,” p. 379. 
