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COMMENDED ESSAY, 1894 . 
decisive blow of tlie day became a marked characteristic of bis later 
battle-fields. Other nations followed the lead of the great master till, 
at Leipzig, the long line of the Allied guns made him angrily exclaim: 
“ At last they have learnt something.” 1 2 
But, well appreciated though the power of a mass of guns might be, 
the inferiority of the materiel in use still prevented them from concen¬ 
trating their fire without a change of position, and consequently, when 
a great effect was desired, a mass of batteries had to be brought up to 
the decisive point. In order that this mass might be ready to respond 
quickly to the call for it, it had to be held in reserve till the supreme 
moment arrived. 
Thus, while Napoleon was particularly careful to keep his artillery in 
close association with the other arms, he was obliged to utilise as a 
reserve the guns of the corps (usually that of the Guard 3 ) not engaged. 
The American War of Secession showed that the secret of Napoleon’s 
success with artillery had not been lost sight of on the other side of 
the Atlantic. Malvern Hill and Gettysburg are as conspicuous artil¬ 
lery battles as Friedland or Wagram, and Hunt and Alexander are 
names as worthy of remembrance by gunners as are Senarmont and 
Druot. 
Coming down to 1866, we find the Prussians keenly alive to the 
lessons of the earlier wars, but following still, in spite of the experiences 
of 1859, the methods which showed Napoleon at Leipzig that " they 
had learnt something.” To benefit by teaching, you must be ready to 
modify lessons as circumstances alter, and apply knowledge to the 
situation of the moment. The invention of rifling had enabled guns to 
be utilised from the very beginning of an engagement, and the Austrians 
brought the bulk of theirs to bear from the first. The Prussians hesi¬ 
tated to avail themselves completely of the consequences which had 
followed the advance of science, and while they massed their guns, 
held them uselessly in hand. 
The fact that a mobile and far-ranging artillery is practically a new 
arm, had not indeed been realised. Mobility allowed guns to be com¬ 
bined together, and at favourable opportunities, even when their range 
was short, that quality was sufficient to permit them to intervene 
decisively in the fight. Now, however, when great range and accuracy 
have been added to mobility, it is possible to concentrate guns together 
always, and they can change their target without altering their posi¬ 
tion. And it must not be forgotten that, to thoroughly develop the 
advantages of concentration, a certain fixity of position is required, and 
that ground once taken up must not be lightly abandoned. 
Use in masses is, in fact, the logical sequence to mobility and range. 3 
1 “ Precis of Modern Tactics.” (Pratt and Home.) p. 88. 
How swiftly, decisively, even impatiently Napoleon turned guns to account is very strikingly 
illustrated in the account of his passage of the Elbe, in May, 1813 :— ££ No sooner did Napoleon 
see the preparations of the enemy than he called out, in a voice of thunder, to General Druit: 
‘ A hundred pieces of cannon !’ and posted himself at a short distance in the rear, to direct their 
disposition. The Artillei'y of the Guard quickly came up at the gallop.”—Alison, Vol. XVI., p. 
226 . 
2 ££ C’est Vartillerie de ma garde qui decide la plupart desbattailles, parce qwe Vayant to uj ours 
sur la main , Je puis la porter partout ou il est necessaire .”— Napoleon. 
3 t£ Id Artillerie de campagne en liason avec les antres armes Langlois. Vol. I., p. 382. 
