COMMENDED ESSAY, 1894 . 
377 
Corps Artillery leader sliould have a similar staff at his disposal. We 
should then possess the germs from which an efficient mass of guns 
might be expected to spring. This addition to our artillery organisation 
is believed to be a very modest one, and is kept as low as possible in 
order that it may have a chance of being accepted. 
Further, it may be added, that the necessity for special scouts for the 
minor battle units is being everywhere felt, in consequence of the in¬ 
troduction of smokeless powder and the difficulties in discovering the 
proximity of an enemy thus engendered. Good scouting demands 
special training, and it is not enough to rely on the services of a man 
picked up casually because he is not otherwise employed. Moreover, 
each arm has its own peculiar requirements and weaknesses, and these 
should be thoroughly appreciated by those who look after its safety. 1 2 
Even a battery should, in regard to the increased independence with 
which guns have lately become endowed, and are rightly expected to 
display, be sufficient in itself to all the exigencies of war, and the new 
German Artillery Regulations have prescribed that batteries, especially 
those on the flanks, must not rely for security against surprise on the 
other arms alone. 3 Even in the French artillery, where establishments 
are on a particularly liberal scale, both as regards men aud horses, it has 
been recommended by Colonel Langlois, that four men and four horses 
should be provided and trained for this special service on mobilisation, 
to be represented by half that number in time of peace. 3 It is there¬ 
fore suggested that some such increment will be necessary in our service 
and will materially facilitate the judicious handling of large artillery 
bodies. The lessons of recent artillery tactical days at Aldershot, es¬ 
pecially when cordite has been used, point strongly to a similar conclu¬ 
sion, and reinforce the arguments already adduced. 
The two specific recommendations thus put forward appear the only 
innovations absolutely necessary in the organisation of our existing 
artillery units, but it will not be superfluous to say something generally 
with regard to organisation in relation to the combined handling of 
batteries, for deficiencies here have been always the greatest obstacle 
to their consistent employment in the manner we are dealing with. 
Frederick, and also Napoleon, experienced and remedied such defects, 
aud brilliant as have been the achievements of our smaller units, and 
unsurpassed as they have ever been, both as regards 'personnel and 
materiel, few combined efforts of artillery have distinguished our military 
history, owing largely to the fact that until recently artillery has with 
us been regarded as ff a service of detachments,” and that the battery 
has been viewed as the be all and end all of efficiency. 
Precisely the same defects in organisation had to be overcome in 
America before the arm could assert its real value. When the War of 
Secession broke out, the batteries of the Union were at first attached to 
1 Vide opinions expressed in “ Berittene Infanterie Patrouillen eine eonsequenz des lieutigen 
Kampfes,” by Major Karl Kegenspursky. Published in Vienna, 1890. 
“ L’Artillerie de compagne en liaison avec les autres armes,’’' Vol. II., p. 358. 
li I’ Artillerie est done Varme qtd a le plus besoin d’ etre eclairee .” Ibid, Vol. II., p. 259. 
2 Para. 271. 
“ It is the duty also of Group Commanders to reconnoitre the ground in front of the position.” 
“The Tactics of Field Artillery,” by von Schell, p. 92. 
3 “ Id education de ce personnel seferait de la maniere la plus fructueuse dans tons les exercises 
tactiques sur le terrain 
