378 
COMMENDED ESSAY, 1894 . 
brigades and afterwards to divisions. 1 2 
It wasnot till March, 1864, when bitter experience had demonstrated 
the more excellent way, that the batteries of each Corps d'Armee were 
united into a brigade, and were placed under the command of one 
leader, with a distinct staff and supply department. Up till then, even 
in the Army of the Potomac, which was the first organised of the 
Union forces, tbe four batteries which were attached to a division were 
commanded by Captains, there was no officer in general command of 
them, no field officers, and no staff. The batteries, individually good, 
were but isolated units, and were attached like excresences to incon¬ 
gruous commands of infantry. There was no gradation of rank or 
command, nor was any combined action possible. There was, however, 
a ec reserve ” of artillery, 3 and the organisation of this reserve, side by 
side as it stands with the feeble system just referred to, well exempli¬ 
fies the point we wish to lay stress upon. It was complete in itself, and 
had a distinct commander and staff. Its batteries being concentrated 
under the eye of an experienced chief, Major-General H. T. Hunt, were 
always ready to hand when needed, were more efficient than any others 
and came to be regarded with pride and confidence throughout the 
army. These batteries formed a (< reserve ” only in name, were always 
first in the fight, and foreshadowed, indeed, that “ Corps Artillery ” 
which became the trump card in the hands of the German Generals of 
1870, and has been organised in almost all armies ever since then. 
On the Confederate side the same difficulties were met by the same 
remedy, and before a year was out the genius of Lee, recognising 
what was required, had organised his isolated batteries into “battalions” 
of from four to six batteries, under the command of a Lieut.-Colonel or 
Colonel, while a Major was allotted to every two batteries. 
Turning now to the war of 1870, we shall find the deficiencies of 
the French artillery largely attributable to the very same cause which 
had been shown inimicable to the arm during the American War. On 
the German side, not only had the batteries been trained to act in 
masses from the very commencement of the fight, during the interval 
of peace since 1866, but instructions were issued during mobilisation, 
laying special stress on this particular. In France, however, the battery 
had remained the tactical unit, and each acted for itself. 
At Woerth we find the whole artillery force of the Germans, flinging 
itself in combination, with all the speed it could command, upon the 
foe. On the other side, although the French had 22 batteries on the 
field, there were never more than 17 in action at the same moment, 
and then they were too disseminated, and sometimes stood for as long 
as half-an-hour in position alone. 
Number of batteries in action 
on French sides. 
3 From 9 o’clock to noon... 9 
„ noon to half-past 1 o’clock. 13 
„ half-past 1 to 2 o’clock . 17 or perhaps a few more. 
„ 2 to 4 o’clock . 9 
At 4 o’clock . 18 or perhaps a few more. 
1 Vide articles in the “ Journal of the Military Service Institution, ” TJ.S.A., by General Tidball. 
2 18 batteries, sub-divided into 3 brigades. 
3 “ISartillerie de campaane en liaison avec Us autres armes ,” by Colonel Langlois. Yol. P* 
368. 
