COMMENDED ESSAY, 1894 . 
379 
The three batteries of the 2nd Division (reserve) were not in action 
till 1 o’clock. Of the four batteries of the reserve, one (attached temp¬ 
orarily to the 7th Corps) took up its first position at 1 o’clock ; the other 
three not until 4 o’clock. These batteries of the reserve were, it is 
true, field in concentration after 4 o’clock, but tfieir opportunity fiad 
then vanished. They were put in position under the short-range fire of 
the German Infantry, and could do nothing but sacrifice themselves 
bravely. 
Having thus examined the causes which have lain at the root of the 
artillery deficiencies and successes in the past, we can understand how 
it is that in every modern army the Brigade Division of three batteries 
has come to be regarded as the tactical unit of artillery, and that yet 
battery leaders need not be hide-bound by rigid rules. That unit has 
been evolved as the best daring the experiences of the battle-field, and 
it is so recognised by all authorities. 1 
It may appear to those familiar with Continental organisations, that 
to dwell on the necessity for at least three batteries, held together 
under one command, being regarded as the tactical unit of artillery is 
unnecessary. Universal recognition is now, no doubt, given to the 
principle, but in our service where some batteries, owing to the exigen¬ 
cies of barrack accommodation are still isolated in their peace stations, 
and where some Majors have perhaps, never yet served in a Brigade 
Division at all, we still find a few so wedded to old-fashioned ideas 
that they regard the battery both as the tactical and fire unit, in spite 
of all the drill-book says to the contrary. 2 3 
The whole efficiency of a mass depends on the opposite principle 
being understood, and until we thoroughly appreciate the union of three 
batteries together, it is idle to talk of combining perhaps twelve or 
twenty. The Brigade Division is the foundation from which the mass 
must spring. At the same time, the independence of the battery 
leader, within his own sphere, must be carefully respected. The object 
of combining batteries is not to destroy that most valuable quality. It 
is rather to assist the subordinate commander, and relieve him of one 
set of responsibilities, in order that he may give his whole and undivi¬ 
ded attention to what, after all, is the first duty of artillery, namely, fire. 
We must, therefore, in the formation of masses, remember that two 
j interests, independence and subordination, have to be reconciled, but 
that they are not necessarily antagonistic. 
The duties of the higher artillery leaders are tactical, those of the 
Battery Commanders technical— “ nicht die Waffe Kdmpft , sondern der 
Mensch ” 3 —but there need be no more difficulty in both amply filling 
1 “ Les faits de 1866 ont fait comprendre aux Prussiens la necessite d'un commandement supe- 
i rieur, Pun commandement tactique du groupe, pour assurer la convergence des efforts , settle 
susceptible de produire un resultat, surtout dans Vartillerie. 
JDe la augmentation de Vunite tactique qui devient Vabtheilung et qui est organisee solidement.” 
—Langlois. “F artillerie de compagne,” Vol. I., p. 239 
“ The great range and accuracy of the modern gun renders the combined action of a group of 
batteries far more effective than was formerly the case, and tends to increase the size of the tactical 
battle unit. The group of three or four batteries will, when practicable, be replaced by a unit of 
double its size, working under one command, and kept together prior to deployment.”—Lieut.- 
i Colonel Pratt. “ Precis of Modern Tactics,” 1892, p. 89. 
2 “ Field Artillery Drill,” 1893, p. 150. 
3 “ Pie Fntiviclcelung der Feld Artillerie, etc,” Vol. II., by Lieut.-General Muller. Berlin, 
1893. And the personality of the leader should, therefore, influence as wide an area as possible. 
