COMMENDED ESSAY, 1894. 
385 
Concentration of Fire to prepare the way for the Infantry Attack. 
It is to effect this purpose that masses of guns have in the past most 
frequently been employed. It was the invariable practice of Napoleon 
thus to use his artillery, and his success was so marked that his example 
was not thrown away by others. We have shown that since guns have 
become endowed with increased range, a concentrated fire from a large 
mass of them may be turned to account, even during the earlier phases 
of the fight, while the most modern employment of the arm exhibits 
examples of the use of concentrated masses beyond even what was at¬ 
tempted by Napoleon. Thus during the French army manoeuvres of 
1892, the guns of more than two corps were massed by General Saus- 
sier, against the village of Nargerie, at the battle which took place close 
to it. 1 
Moreover, to win victories men must ultimately come into personal 
collision, the hostile fire must be subdued to enable them to do so, and to 
effect this the aid of guns is necessary, and must always be invoked to 
bring about the culminating movement of the day. Where both sides 
are equally well armed, no progress can be reckoned on in the future, 
any more than in the past, until some overpowering force to create a 
crisis is called in. At the decisive moment, therefore, a mass of guns 
must be ready to turn the full blast of destruction on the decisive 
point. It is with this end in view that it should struggle during the 
earlier hours of the day, and it must disregard its own safety, and risk 
annihilation to support the infantry now. 
It is, however, exceedingly arduous, especially during the close of an 
engagement, to preserve so close a grasp of every unit as will ensure 
success. The heavy firing will interfere with the issue and comprehen¬ 
sion of orders ; it is difficult with many batteries in line to make good 
practice; and finally it is not by any means easy to keep up the fire to 
the very last, and yet stop it just at the moment when the infantry are 
closing on their opponents. Yet the storm, when once let loose, must 
rage with pitiless fury until the bayonet is ready to take up its work. 
A mere recital of what is demanded, and what is in the way, is suffi¬ 
cient, without further words to show how absolutely essential a very 
careful and frequently practised system of training is required if success 
is even to be hoped for. What we need, to be equal to such a task, is 
practice on the drill-ground, and that too, if possible, with projectiles. 
If such a consummation cannot be arranged for, then without, but at 
any rate, exercises in some shape or form, and where it is feasible, with 
other troops. At such manoeuvres, the best method of carrying out 
concentration, to the great end, will be evolved for us, and, being based 
on experience, it will be more valuable than any paper theories. 
It may be well, however, to indicate the salient features that will 
probably govern our decisions. 
The leader of the mass will be informed beforehand by the Com¬ 
mander-in-Chief what Brigade Divisions will be required to actually 
cannonade the point selected for assault, while the remainder guard 
1 Vide “Journal of the United Service Institution,” Yol. XXXVII., p. 965. 
