386 
COMMENDED ESSAY, 1894. 
the field of operations in general, 1 and the exact point selected will be 
explained to him as nearly as possible. 
We must confuse our minds with no pedantries. When in tactical 
language we speak of a point we may refer to a considerable extent of 
ground. That space will next be divided, if necessary, amongst the 
various Brigade Divisions, and the leaders of these will endeavour to 
gauge and verify, if time permit, by a few rounds, the ranges of their 
targets. They will instruct their batteries as to the duties assigned to 
each, and will give orders as to whether fire is to be distributed as 
regards depth. The French consider that during the latter stages of 
an action ranging may often be found impossible, and that when this is 
so it will be wiser to distribute fire by the system of “ Tir progre.ssif,” 2 
or distribution as regards depth (each battery section or gun, as the 
case may be, using a different elevation). 
The battery leaders will similarly instruct their Section Officers, and 
through them their gun-layers. It is necessary, also, to agree on some 
signal that may be readily understood, by which the moment when 
guns are to leave the target they may be engaged with, and turn to 
their most serious duty, shall be indicated. During the recent man¬ 
oeuvres at Chalons, the Brigade Division which was nearest the infantry 
destined for the assault, was given the hour by the leader of these 
troops, and at the proper moment fired three battery salvoes rapidly 
one after the other, which formed the signal to the remainder. As 
might be anticipated, however, mistakes sometimes occurred, owing to 
the nature of such a signal, but on the whole we are assured that good 
results were obtained. It is noteworthy that during the bombardment 
of Plevna, some of the heavy Russian siege guns attempted, in a some¬ 
what similar manner, to direct the fire of the remainder, but with very 
bad results. 3 
A message conveyed quickly, or some sign passed rapidly from bat¬ 
tery to battery, would appear a preferable arrangement. 
With this consummation of its usefulness the potency’of a mass of guns 
may be regarded as exhausted. Individual Brigade Divisions or bat¬ 
teries may accompany and follow up the rush of their brethren of the 
other arm, but scarcely so an agglomeration of units. Whether in view 
of the immense losses amongst horse-flesh that must supervene such an 
attempt will be often made, is a question ; but, if the foe retire in any¬ 
thing like a rout, even a huge mass might undoubtedly advance to his 
position, and from thence pursue and harass him by fire; for it cannot 
too often be inculcated that as long as the foe remains within effective 
range, the pursuit by fire should never be allowed to slacken. 4 
Ammunition Supply. 
No discussion as to the training of artillery for war can be complete 
without some words as to ammunition supply. Our labour in perfect- 
' It is usually necessary to continue to engage the artillery of the defence with some guns, 
“ otherwise it will direct its fire on the attacking infantry, and inflict serious losses on it, to which 
it must not he subjected.”—von Schell, p. 77. 
2 Vide the report on the field firing of masses of artillery, at the Camp of Chalons, in 1892, 
already referred to. 
3 Kouropatkin on the Russo-Turkish War; translated into. German by Krahmer. 
4 The point is well brought out by Lieut.-Colonel Regenspursky, of the Austrian Army, in his 
recent book; " Studien iiber den taJctischen Inhalt , etc,” 
