888 
COMMENDED ESSAY, 1894. 
One word may be added ere we leave this portion of the subject. 
The supply of ammunition should be under the Battery Commander. 
The experiences at Aldershot, last May, convinced every officer who 
witnessed them of this, and it was felt that decentralisation was the best 
policy to be pursued here. While, therefore, the higher leader should 
exercise a wise, far-seeing, and careful superintendence, he should avoid 
anything approaching interference in what is to the battery a technical 
matter. 
Conclusion. 
“ A ring of steel discipline .” 1 
In conclusion we have only to add that the use of artillery in masses 
is no new thing , 2 and that we need depart from no traditions nor break 
with any cherished sympathies, when we loyally accept what the exi¬ 
gencies of modern war have imposed upon us. We may still be proud 
of our batteries, still respect the prerogative of their leaders, but we 
must give effect to our views under changed circumstances in a different 
way. A man will not clothe himself in precisely the same costume iu 
January and July. In one case he may wear fur, in the other flannel. 
But he will nevertheless always dress on the same principle and to the 
same end, namely, to keep his body warm. Artillery has the same 
objects in view now as it had at the commencement of the century, but 
its application must be modified, nevertheless, to suit the alterations 
which the march of science has drawn with it. Where the battery was 
once all-sufficing, the Brigade Division must now take its place, and we 
must work through even that unit to larger masses still, as long as we 
organise our army on Continental lines at all. Artillery was always most 
effectively employed when it was thrown ungrudgingly into the scale. 
The growth and continued advance of ballistic science has not only de¬ 
veloped the possibility, but has increased the necessity, of so employing 
it. Where large armies meet it will indeed be impossible to handle it 
otherwise. This being so, and bearing in mind the difficulties of direct¬ 
ing the fire of even three batteries, how important is it for us to strive 
after a good and uniform system of dealing with that of several Brigade 
Divisions ? We cannot hope to come even within sight of perfection un¬ 
less we have opportunities of practice during which every link in the chain 
may be tested, and every soldier, from the very highest to the lowest,learn 
to understand one another, to support one another, and work together 
for the common end. Our discipline, especially as regards fire tactics, 
must control a wider field than that occupied by six or even eighteen 
guns. So shall artillery always be enabled to fulfil its role of opening 
the battle, of smothering the hostile guns, of shaking the enemy's in¬ 
fantry, of pursuing with avenging shells the flying foe ; and thus, if it 
do not actually gain the victory, it may claim, at any rate, that the road 
thither has been paved by its exertions. 
1 “French Revolution.”—Carlyle. 
2 Thus, Lieut.-General Muller in his recent volume oil “ Die Fntwickelung der Feld Artillerie, 
etc.” points out that the modern views with regard to artillery tactics, based as they largely are on 
the experiences of 1866, closely correspond with those laid down by Tempelhoff, in the translation 
by Paget: “ Fssai sur V usage de V artillerie dans la guerre de campagne, etc.” published in 1771 • 
