412 
ARTILLERY MOBILISATION. 
In preparing tables of this nature there are a few guiding principles 
which must be common to all, the following may be suggested as the 
most important • 
I. Calculation of the number of reliefs which can be furnished 
from the personnel available. Works which are likely to sustain a pro¬ 
longed attack on a sea front should, if possible, have three reliefs; 
since in the case of ship versus fort, the victory is likely to go to the 
side which can hit hardest without intermission for the greatest length 
of time, and in such an action the result is likely to be much more 
sudden and decisive, than would be the case in a land action. Reliefs 
should be maintained intact for administrative purposes, and assimil¬ 
ated as closely as possible to the existing organisation of the units 
which furnish them. 
II. Sudden attacks are most to be feared on the sea front: a first 
relief for all sea front works should, therefore, be provided from the 
units which are usually on the spot, these units may be 
(a.) Companies of Royal Artillery. 
(b.) Volunteer Corps whose head-quarters are in the locality. 
(c.) Militia Corps whose head-quarters are in the locality. 
These three classes will usually be more or less immediately avail¬ 
able in the order given, and should, therefore, be allotted as first reliefs 
to works in the relative order of importance of the works. 
Second and third reliefs should be provided, so far as is consistent 
with the foregoing principles, from the same units which furnish the 
first relief; this course will, however, seldom be possible in the case of 
works manned by the R.A., and recourse should then be had to Militia 
and Volunteer Corps which come from a distance. 
The Corps which come from a distance, after satisfying the above 
conditions, should then be allotted to works less liable to sudden attack, 
or to attack at an early stage of mobilisation. 
III. Mixed detachments, or mixture of different units in the same 
work, is much to be deprecated; it is almost certain to involve admin¬ 
istrative confusion and loss of fighting efficiency. 
IV. Circumstances alter cases, but it may be accepted as an axiom, 
that the mobilisation tables should not merely be tables for war man¬ 
ning, but should equally be the basis of all peace manning for combined 
drills and practice. Officers of considerable experience have advocated 
two sets of tables, one for peace manning and the other for war man¬ 
ning ; it is thought, however, that such an arrangement is open to 
serious objections, inasmuch as there must inevitably be a certain 
amount of dislocation in important administrative details, and a ten¬ 
dency to look upon the peace manning as the ever present reality, 
while the war manning is relegated to a secondary place and becomes 
an unfamiliar contingency. I once heard a very smart and capable 
officer remark that the arrangements he had made for a peace manning 
were perfect in every detail, and that it would be easy enough to make¬ 
shift for the war manning when the time came ! 
(Conclusion.) 
