THE FRENCH SOUDAN. 
435 
heavily laden. Col. Bonnier reached Timbuctou on the 10th January, 
and wrote the following despatch next day:— 
“Timbuctou, 11th January, 1894. 
Lieut.-Colonel Bonnier, Commanding Troops in the Soudan FraiiQais, 
to Monsieur, the Governor of Soudan, at Kayes. 
Monsieur le Gouverneur, 
All the archives being at Kayes, I cannot quote, in this despatch, 
the dates and exact text of the correspondence of the senior Commandant of the 
Soudan, relative to the flotilla. But, if you think it necessary, you will be able 
to discover these dates and text in the registers now in your possession. 
An examination of these documents will show that:— 
1. Colonel Archinard (Colonel Bonnier’s predecessor in office), whilst leav¬ 
ing to the commandant of the flotilla all latitude in regard to 
convoying merchant lighters to Kabara, prohibited him from carrying- 
on any military operation. 
2. I, myself, in confirming the instructions of Colonel Archinard, forbade 
the commandant of the flotilla, most expressely, to land from his 
vessel in the neighbourhood of Timbuctou. I had, in an equally 
express manner, warned him against taking any action on the banks 
of the Niger, and, latterly, fearing some adventure on his part, I sent 
a formal order not to quit his naval station. 
Lieutenant Boiteux, commanding the flotilla, took no notice whatever of these 
orders. M. Boiteux proceeded to Kabara, from which place he easily drove out 
the hostile people. Leaving his gun-boats at Kabara, he further went on to 
Timbuctou, the submission of which place, as I have before reported, had been 
already otherwise acquired. 
M. Boiteux has thus not only disobeyed the orders of his superior officer, but 
he has besides committed a military mistake {ahsurelite). 
With a thoughtlessness, incomprehensible in an officer holding such a position, 
he did not weigh the consequences which might result from the course he took. 
He did not consider that, with the few men which he had at his disposal, it was 
easy enough to enter an open town claiming our protection, but that he could not 
ensure this protection. 
He did not consider that it was wrong for him to go on shore, leaving his gun¬ 
boats deprived of a portion of their too feeble crews. 
Moreover, that occurred which was most likely to happen. A detachment, 
consisting of Sub-Lieutenant Aube, a second master (European), and 15 ‘Laptots,’ 
were massacred by the Touaregs. Two native Laptots alone succeeded in escaping. 
M. Boiteux cannot escape the responsibility which he thus incurred. 
My preceding despatches 1 have acquainted you with my march on Timbuctou, 
and the necessity which I was under to continue that march after the receipt of 
your telegram, No. 2, and conformably to the clause contained in the last para¬ 
graph of that telegram. 
Events have, unfortunately, but too well justified my conduct. 
On my arrival at Timbuctou I had an interview, in the presence of Captain 
Kegad, my chief of the staff, with Lieutenant Boiteux, and reproved him for the 
faults which he had committed—that is to say, disobedience of orders by his 
superior officer, and military misconduct for his action and consequent disaster at 
Kabara. 
1 Not yet published, 
