THE FRENCH SOUDAN. 
439 
to leave a strong garrison at Timbuctou, and to take all necessary- 
measures to ensure the safety of that post. The raid and razzias which 
led the column under Bonnier to Dougoi could hardly be said to form 
part of the programme to act strictly on the defensive. So the con¬ 
tention that M. Grodet could be held responsible for the late disaster 
was altogether untenable. 
On receipt of the news of the disaster at Dougoi in Paris, some 
excitement necessarily was manifested, but the patriotic declaration 
made by the then President of Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
M. Casimir-Perier (now better known as the newly-elected President 
of the Kepublic) in the Chamber of Deputies, on the 10th February, 
was characteristic of the traditional policy of the French nation. M. 
Casimir-Perier announced that reinforcements from Algeria would 
immediately be despatched to the front with the least possible delay. 
He added — ee The Chamber will think, evidently, like the Government, 
that there can be no question of evacuating Timbuctou. It is impossi¬ 
ble : France does not draw back before a check, however severe it may 
be. That is impossible, I repeat; viewing it even from the standpoint 
of our security, that would be the most imprudent of measures.” 
After this statement was made by M. Casimir-Perier in the Chamber, 
an attempt was made by interested parties to shift the responsibility 
for the unfortunate disaster of Dougoi from the military commander to 
the Civil Governor. It was asserted that the despatches communicated 
to Parliament and to the public had been mutilated, and that, for 
example, in the despatch of Captain Philippe, the words “en recon¬ 
naissance” had been interpolated, in order to throw the personal 
responsibility of the movement entirely upon the late Colonel Bonnier. 
According to the version which it was sought to give credence to, the 
commander of the column which had occupied Timbuctou had left that 
town in obedience to the formal orders which had been brought to him 
by Major Hugny; and it was on this return march towards Kayes, 
carried out in conformity with the instructions from the Civil Governor, 
that Lieut.-Colonel Bonnier, Major Hugny, and their comrades had 
lost their lives. 
This theory, apart from the fact that it id no way exonerates the 
leader from the responsibility of want of precaution and being caught 
asleep by the Touaregs in their surprise attack, cannot be made to 
agree with the fact that Colonel Bonnier had left, several miles in rear 
of his main-body, under command of Sub-Lieutenant Sarda, a detach¬ 
ment guarding the captured cattle. Had the column under Bonnier 
been in retreat on Kayes, it would surely not have been followed by a 
rear-guard, encumbered, moreover, by herds of captured cattle, the pos¬ 
session of which would utterly retard the march of troops operating in 
an enemy's country, where it was highly desirable to be on the alert 
against sudden attacks, in which the Touaregs excel, as all the world 
knows, or ought to know. 
Why not admit, on the face of it, the facts self-evident from the 
text of Captain Philippe's telegraphic despatch, that the light flying 
column led by Colonel Bonnier, accompanied by all his staff, was on 
the march against a Touareg encampment, in order to avenge Gie death 
