470 
ATTACK OF A MODERN LAND FORTRESS. 
Siege 
Batteries, 
Nature of 
unit selected 
for Siege 
Train. 
Necessity 
for curtail¬ 
ing the time 
occupied in 
preliminary 
operations'. 
would appear that they may expect absolute immunity from attack from 
the beginning to the end of a siege, while the combined fire of the 
heavy concealed howitzers of the Defence can be brought to bear on 
the guns of the Attack. 
This point of the absolute safety of concealed Howitzer Batteries of 
both Attack and Defence without in any way impairing the accuracy of 
their fire is a sufficiently startling one; for, if we accept the fact that 
our heavy siege ordnance should consist solely of howitzers, we are led to 
the conclusion that the howitzer of the Defence can take no part in the 
Artillery duel, and that the guns of the Defence cannot return the fire 
of their adversary because they cannot ascertain where he is and could 
not touch him if they did ! 
We have here nothing short of a revolution in siege warfare. 
At all events they are sufficiently important considerations to point' to 
the absolute necessity for concealment for the ordnance of the Attack ; 
and, if this be obtained, it seems to follow that the necessity for the 
construction of Siege Batteries disappears and that nothing more will 
be required than good platforms and some light form of shelter to inter¬ 
cept stray bullets or splinters; field-magazines for the ammunition and 
night-arming also cease to be necessary. 
In any case, it is not easy to see the necessity for thick parapets for 
either batteries or redoubts; they can readily be breached by howitzer 
fire, although no gunner will be so foolish as to attempt to do so when 
he can drop his shell over them and destroy the gun or other objective 
concealed ; the outer thickness of a parapet only serves to catch a shell 
which would otherwise burst harmlessly in hard ground, outside a 
thinner parapet; where splinter-proofs in redoubts are constructed be¬ 
neath them, no doubt they serve a purpose by being made thick. 
The question whether heavy or light units should compose the Siege 
Train, depends almost entirely on the state of preparation of the 
fortress, and the nature of its ordnance and character of their mount¬ 
ings. Whether the heavy or light units are selected, transport by 
road would hardly be practicable. It is more important to have a 
superior nature than to have a greater number of heavy ordnance 
than the defence, not only on account of the heavier howitzers doing 
work more rapidly, but on account of their greater accuracy, and con¬ 
sequently economising ammunition and transport. A large number 
will not be necessary if they are in concealed positions, as they can 
destroy the heavy ordnance of the defence in detail, but the possibility 
of the defender masking some of his guns till the close attack is devel¬ 
oped must be allowed for, and a sufficient number of howitzers be 
available to open fire on them. Experience proves (as in the cases 
of Sebastopol, Danzig and Belfort) the dangers and reverses that ac¬ 
company a siege commenced with insufficient resources; at the same 
time Continental Powers recognise that to bring up a regular Siege 
Train takes so much time, that an attempt should be made to curtail 
this period by having light siege ordnance (corresponding to our 
Auxiliary Armament), which can move with a Field Army, and be 
brought into action before the arrival of the Siege Train; and many 
writers advocate an attack by main force, preceded by a general bom- 
