476 
ATTACK OF A MODERN LAND FORTRESS. 
(5.) Their employment in the later stages of the attack would be 
confined, to a great extent, to a general bombardment of 
the forts to prevent their being manned, and this can be 
done at long ranges. 
(6.) That at short ranges the necessary angle of descent for 
breaching will probably not be attainable. 
(7.) Commanding ground for observation of fire is more likely to 
be obtainable at long ranges, and the observers would run 
considerable risk at short ones. 
There is nothing, however, to prevent heavy howitzers being pushed 
forward when occasion demands, should favourable positions be found 
for them as the attack progresses, or should it be found that some risk 
must be run for some special purpose. 
The above objections do not hold to the same extent for the field 
howitzers, which, in the earlier stages, would be employed chiefly against 
the advanced infantry posts (1000 yards nearer than the objectives of 
the heavy howitzers), and which could, and must be, pushed forward in 
the later stages of the attack. 
Bombard. The bombardment of the defence by the Siege Train will now be 
^Defences! 10 commenced, and sufficient ammunition for five days should be available 
Heavy at 106 rounds a-day per piece. The fire of the heavy howitzers would 
Howitzers, a j } confined to attacking all ordnance which is sufficiently ex¬ 
posed for their position to be located. 
Artillery Nearly all writers recommend that the full artillery power of the 
Duel * defence should be thrown into this duel; but they overlook the fact 
previously mentioned, that there will be nothing for it to fire at if 
the attacking batteries are well concealed, and that every exposed 
gun that opens fire can be quickly destroyed; therefore, the defenders 
should carefully mask their guns and reserve their fire until the in¬ 
fantry attack commences. Should they be sufficiently well advised 
to adopt these tactics, there appears to be nothing for it but to com¬ 
mence the bombardment and attack of the advanced infantry position 
by the Auxiliary Armament and infantry, preceded and accompanied 
by a heavy bombardment of the detached forts and redoubts by the 
heavy howitzers: should the artillery of the defence still reserve their 
fire the advanced posts may be captured, but should they open fire and 
so disclose their position, the howitzers must at once turn their fire on 
them ; and here great stress must be laid on the vital importance of 
rapidity in our methods of obtaining the line and ranging with 
howitzers: any delay at this critical juncture means heavy loss to the 
infantry, while success means that, not only will the advanced posts 
be carried, but that should the defenders be sufficiently demoralised the 
attack may be pushed home against the main position with every chance 
of terminating the contest by its capture. 
Should there be any doubt as to the possibility of capturing the main 
works by such a coup-de-main, the infantry will entrench themselves 
strongly in the captured infantry positions; the Auxiliary Armament 
will have been already pushed forward to their support, and the breach¬ 
ing of the escarps of the detached forts must be commenced without 
