FLOATING DEFENCE. 
487 
that they would render a close blockade by night difficult, if not impos¬ 
sible. Such naval dispositions as are described by Hobart Pasha in his 
account of blockade running at Wilmington—comparatively ineffective 
as they proved—-could scarcely have been maintained in face of a 
torpedo-boat flotilla vigorously handled. On the other hand, blockades 
obviously cannot be attempted by the weaker of two naval Powers, and 
to seek to avert them by local measures is emphatically not the policy 
of Great Britain. Again, torpedo-boats could not possibly prevent a 
raid with a view to bombardment, if such a proceeding were really 
likely to commend itself to our enemies. Nor would the observation or 
reconnaissance of a port be rendered impracticable by their presence in 
any reasonable numbers. In the case of distant Colonial harbours, such 
as Singapore, Hong Kong, Melbourne or Auckland, a Cecille or a Rurik 
haunting the exterior waters, could not possibly be driven off by any 
form of floating defence. Whether the steam trade of these ports could 
be effectively interrupted by such means is extremely doubtful in view 
of the experience of the Confederate blockade-runners; but occasional 
captures would probably be made so long as the hostile cruisers could 
maintain their stations. Thus the protection of the port from this highly 
probable form of danger must depend absolutely on the action of the 
navy. 
There remains the question of look-out vessels, whose employment 
for local objects has found advocates. By night, no useful purpose can 
thus be served. A local steamer, stationed or cruising off Malta or Mel¬ 
bourne, would either discover nothing or ensure her own capture. By 
day, the utmost that could be accomplished would be warning briefly 
anticipated. Communication between the look-out ship and the shore 
could perhaps be maintained over 12 miles. Having waited to make out 
an enemy, the only course would be to retreat at full speed. When it is 
remembered that any high land in the neighbourhood commands a far 
more extended view than can be obtained from a ship's crow's nest, it 
seems probable that the utmost gain would little exceed half-an-hour— 
a period which would scarcely be of real importance to any well organ¬ 
ised port. The cult of the look-out ship is probably founded upon some 
false military analogy, some restricted system of outposts or patrols 
which has no parallel on the seas. The general conclusion appears 
inevitable that the advantages of floating defence in exterior waters are 
purely illusory. Protection must depend upon the action of the sea¬ 
going navy which can directly cover the national ports in the only 
effective way without local assistance. 
B.—The term “interior waters" is relative only. In the strategical 
sense, it might be held to include the Irish Channel, the Bay of Fundy, 
the mouth of the St. Lawrence for a hundred miles, and the thousand 
miles of sea which lie within the great Barrier Reefs of Queensland. 
The protection of such waters as these is, however, evidently the 
duty of the sea-going navy or of a special force operating freely, 1 and 
does not fall within the province of floating defence as above defined. 
1 It is, for example, conceivable, though most undesirable, that the waters of the Irish Channel 
might be guarded by a large force of torpedo-boats. Such a force, however, must necessarily be 
entirely in naval hands, freed from all responsibilities in respect to particular ports, and wholly 
apart from mere floating defence. 
