488 
floating defence. 
Interior waters in tlie present connection are those only which are 
entered by a defensible channel, or which permit free handling of the 
class of hostile vessel which could reasonably be expected to enter them, 
and which cannot be covered by artillery fire from the shore. Such 
waters are rare throughout the British Empire. It is commonly for¬ 
gotten that every condition which gave importance to inland fighting 
during the American Civil War is wanting in our wide and scattered 
territories. The fringe of inland waters which stretches along nearly 
the whole eastern seaboard of the United States, the wide land-locked 
bays and the great rivers have not fallen to our share of the world. 
At Mobile, Farragut’s squadron, once entrance was effected, found 
free manoeuvring waters. Beyond New Orleans lay the Mississippi, 
navigable by his whole squadron for nearly 300 miles. We have only 
one Mobile Bay—Port Phillip—and the defence of our only Mississippi 
—the St. Lawrence—must necessarily be from without and not from 
within. The lessons of the American war are rich and varied; but 
oblivion of the primary conditions of the combatants has caused them 
to be deplorably misapplied. Between our ports and an enemy’s 
squadron lies the greatest navy in the world; but defective imagination 
causes its presence to be ignored, and Captain Mahan’s reminder, 
carrying a force which an English writer cannot hope to wield, was 
unquestionably needed. The storm-beaten ships hundreds of miles 
from the shores of England, ships which the soldiers of the Grand 
Army never saw, and whose very existence was forgotten, effectually 
guarded our seaboard and shattered the designs of Napoleon. If the 
Northern and Southern States had possessed even equality of naval 
resources, fighting in inland waters would not have entered into their 
operations. These considerations are vital to the present question ; for, 
so long as the command of the seas is retained, hostile vessels suitable 
for service in interior waters cannot be moved over large distances of 
sea; and, of special craft, only 2nd class torpedo-boats transported by 
large cruisers need be considered in relation to the majority of our ports. 
Small harbours, such as Malta, Singapore, Mauritius, St. George’s 
Bermuda, and ports lying far up difficult channels of approach, such as 
London and Glasgow, can be left out of account. Wherever an arma¬ 
ment can be effectively employed on shore, it is idle to put it afloat, and 
any measure of protection which the sea-going navy cannot supply, can 
in all these cases be provided on shore. It may be urged that localised 
torpedo-boats might prove valuable at ports, such as Malta or Singa¬ 
pore, to attack the transports of a force seeking to land in the vicinity. 1 
Such a contingency, assuming it to arise, would evidently be first 
recognised by the naval commander-in-chief, whose, dispositions would 
be framed to meet it, and no special local provision seems either necessary 
or desirable. Similarly, in naval ports such as Portsmouth, Plymouth, 
or Chatham, floating defence, if ever required, is certain to be present. 
Special provision is superfluous. Finally, in all waters over which fire 
from the shore is intended to be employed, mobile floating defence is a 
pure encumberance. 
iJust as torpedo-boats from Valparaiso might possibly have acted against the Congressionalist 
transports in Quinteros Bay. 
