FLOATING DEFENCE. 
489 
In ports containing vessels liable to torpedo-boat attack, small craft in 
motion must by nigbt be fired at without question, and by day any inter¬ 
ference with the free use of artillery fire would be an intolerable 
restriction to an arm of the first importance. 
In every remaining case, the only questions are as to whether floating 
defence possesses any real advantage—sufficient to justify its provision- 
over the means of attack, and in what manner it can be usefully 
employed ? A vague demand for light draught armour-clads, gun¬ 
boats, armed steamers, torpedo-boats or guard-boats, should invariably 
be resisted. Their several advocates must be forced to show a case. 
Two ports, more or less typical, suggest themselves as possibly suit¬ 
able for the employment of floating defence. At Bombay, it already 
exists in the form of the Abyssinia and Magdala turret ships, the 
Assaye and Plassey torpedo gun-boats of the Sharpshooter class, and 
some torpedo-boats. At Liverpool, it has not passed beyond the paper 
stage. 
An attack with a view to hold or destroy Bombay could be under¬ 
taken only by an expeditionary force, when the command of the sea had 
been lost. The difficulties and risks of a naval raid in any strength are 
considerable, since the nearest refuge of a naval Power—Diego Suarez— 
is 2300 miles distant. The object of such a raid must be to destroy or 
remove shipping or to injure the town and docks by bombardment. To 
what extent will floating defence avert this danger, assuming it to exist ? 
Examine the chart of Bombay (Plate I.) and endeavour to formulate some 
definite course of action for the Abyssinia and Magdala. Their speed is 
probably eight knots. If sent out to sea their seven to ten inches of 
armour would confer an advantage over an unarmoured cruiser, but their 
slow manoeuvring speed would prove a heavy handicap. An early retreat 
would seem unavoidable. Once back within the waters of the harbour, 
where shall they be posted ? If on the side of Oyster Rock and middle 
ground, they will merely become supplementary and relatively ineffi¬ 
cient batteries. If at the edge of the Karanja Reef, then, almost 
inevitably, they will either interfere with the fire of the batteries when 
it is likely to be most effective, or throw their shell into the buildings 
and docks, or both. A better position would perhaps be near Tucker 
Beacon; but the drawback would only be postponed. If kept under 
weigh, they might perhaps find favourable opportunities to engage. 
If a hostile vessel took the ground at a point where the shore batteries 
could not reach her, they would probably be able to settle her fate. 
On the whole, the advantages of these vessels do not appear propor¬ 
tionate to their cost. So long as no coast batteries existed, their 
protection was necessarily valuable, and they, at least, imposed a certain 
minimum strength upon a raiding force. Now, they can do little 
that cannot be more effectually accomplished by fixed defences. Turn¬ 
ing to the Assaye and Plassey, it is difficult to assign to them a suitable 
role. They each carry two 4‘7-in. Q.P. guns; their speed is perhaps 
19 knots. For destroying torpedo-boats they are well suited, but an 
enemy's cruisers could scarcely send in their boats by day, and the 
chasing of torpedo-boats by night in such waters would resemble “the 
hunting of the snark.” To send out these gun-boats to engage the much 
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