490 
FLOATING DEFENCE. 
more powerful vessels which an enemy must employ would involve 
their fruitless sacrifice. If kept out of the way at first, they may find 
chances of employment, most probably in the case of a hostile ship 
already disabled. The situation of a hostile ship disabled at Bombay 
with no available port within 2300 miles will, however, be sufficiently 
precarious. Almost any employment of the Assaye and Plassey in war 
would apparently be more useful than to tether them to Bombay. 
The local torpedo-boats would doubtless prevent an enemy’s ships 
unprovided with nets from anchoring for the night in Bombay roads. 
Chances for their employment might possibly arise if, as is improbable, 
ships were committed to a serious engagement with the coast batteries. 
While, therefore, Bombay, undefended, would court injury from a 
flying raid of fast cruisers, even though the command of the sea was in 
our hands, existing fixed defences combine with geographical position 
to make such an attempt supremely improbable, and floating defences 
now appear to be a somewhat superfluous addition. 
At Liverpool (see Plate II.) the conditions are different. A narrow 
and exceptionally difficult channel affords the only entrance for large 
ships. A maze of dangerous banks, extending to more than 10,000 
yards from the most exposed docks, confer substantial protection. 
Bombardment by heavy ships is possible only by entering the channel 
and accepting an engagement with fixed defences in very cramped 
waters. Such a proceeding would evidently involve grave risks, and 
even if the geographical position of Liverpool Bay were more favourable 
to an enemy’s enterprises, it does not fall within the limits of reasonable 
probability. A heavily armoured turret-ship moored at X. and pro¬ 
tected against torpedo-boat attack would obviously be a formidable 
antagonist, viewed from the purely academical standpoint. But this is 
not the question, and the naval aspects of an attack upon Liverpool can 
be properly appreciated only by imagining the place to be situated at 
the mouth of the Gironde and the relative strength of the French and 
British navies to be reversed. 
Again, the docks and shipping of Liverpool might be attacked by a 
light draught flotilla, manoeuvring freely over the banks at high tide, 
and floating defences might be demanded to meet such an attack. The 
mouth of the Mersey lies, however, strategically within interior waters, 
and the conditions necessary for the employment of the requisite flotilla 
in such waters imply that Liverpool as a commercial port has already 
ceased to exist. Protection against this form of attack must evidently 
stand or fall with the general naval defence of the Empire. 
The case of Port Phillip (Plate III.)—the British Mobile—differs 
considerably from those of Bombay and Liverpool. Once past the 
difficulties of the entrance,, an enemy’s squadron is in broad and 
open interior waters, giving ample manoeuvring space and free access 
to Melbourne. Assuming the absence of all protection by artillery 
fire or mines, it would necessarily be the function of floating defence 
to engage an enemy while hampered by difficulties of navigation. 
Advantage would be sought in light draught and consequently greater 
freedom of movement. If the enemy succeeded in efiecting a pas¬ 
sage, the advantage would at once pass to him, since his force in 
