FLOATING DEFENCE. 
491 
open waters would necessarily be superior. Immensely powerful fixed 
defences haying been provided, the role that falls to the local flotilla 
is that contemplated by Buchanan at Mobile—to remain behind the 
line of defence, endeavour to supplement the action of the batteries on 
shore, and complete the discomfiture of any vessel which had received 
from them rough handling. At Mobile this plan failed, for Farragut 
lost only one vessel, and this by misadventure, in making the passage, 
and his squadron having been little injured by . the fire of the single 
obsolete Fort Morgan, easily overpowered the weak floating defences. 
The difficulties of navigation were, however, inconsiderable, and the 
only risk was that of an indifferent mine-field, which might have been 
avoided if Farragut's wishes had been carried out. 
At Port Phillip there are available the Cerberus, turret-ship, with 
four 8-in. B.L. guns, 8 to 11-in. armour protection, and perhaps 9 knots 
speed; the Victoria and Albert, unarmoured gun-boats of 11 and 9 
knots; four smaller gun-boats, armed hopper barges and torpedo-boats. 
Such a flotilla, taken in conjunction with the hydrographical conditions, 
is evidently formidable. If floating defence has any. special value, this 
should suffice alone to protect the entrance of Port Phillip against any 
attack likely to be attempted from bases more than 4000 miles distant. 
To it is added, however, a strong mine-field and fixed defences mount¬ 
ing 30 or more guns disposed in two lines. Assuming the second line 
of defence—Swan Island, South Channel and Frankston forts—to be 
suppressed and the strength of the first line to be halved, floating 
defence might perhaps be justified. If the distance of Melbourne from 
the Heads were so short as to render it probable that torpilleurs era 
barques would be sent in by night from cruisers outside, a catcher would 
be a reasonable provision. 
Space fails to discuss the few other British ports in which floating 
defence appears capable of any justification. To them must be applied 
the following questions :— 
(a.) What form of attack is reasonably probable ? 
(b.) What special protection does floating defence promise which 
fixed defences cannot better secure ? 
(c.) How can local craft be employed so as not to prove an 
encumbrance to the defence ? 
Only in cases where the two latter questions can be satisfactorily 
answered may the provision of floating defence be justified. Guard- 
boats, which have been the subject of the wildest theorising, are 
perhaps already defunct ? Mines, in the very few British ports to which 
they are applicable, can be defended from the shore. In ports liable to 
torpedo-boat attack all suspicious craft must, at night, be fired upon 
without question, and moving guard-boats would become either mere 
targets to their friends on shore or dangerous impediments to fire at a 
critical moment. A preposterous proposal to establish torpedo-boats 
manned by local crews appears at intervals in the press and finds sup¬ 
porters. To the first question—What are those boats to do ? Ho 
satisfactory answer is forthcoming. We must, apparently, fall back 
