516 
NAVAL MANOEUVRES, 1894. 
considered Let us su PP ose f° r a moment that we are considering land opera¬ 
tor military tions; what would be the probable action of Blue ? Briefly this: form 
^view? a Central Reserve, delay the enemy on either flank by means of small 
retarding forces, and throw the weight of the reserve, combined with 
these retarding forces alternately, against the separated divisions of the 
enemy. 
To apply this principle to the members actually engaged, we might 
have— 
D. Blue (19 points) to retard B. Red (32 points). The seven 2nd 
class cruisers and three older battle-ships of C. Blue (19 points) to 
retard A. Red (32 points), and a Central Reserve, consisting of three 1st 
class battle-ships and one 1st class cruiser of 0. Blue (19 points), ready 
to throw its weight to either flank and so raise the total to 38 points, 
sufficient to ensure victory. 
Conditions But to hope for success from such a disposition three things would 
torTZUs. be necessary 
ful action. 
(a.) 
(b.) 
(c.) 
The country must be favourable in the way of obstacles for 
the retarding forces, otherwise they would be destroyed 
before help could arrive. 
The communications from flank to flank must be such that 
the Central Reserve would have freedom of movement. 
How far 
fulfilled. 
The territory in which the Central Reserve is operating must 
be able to furnish it with supplies. 
Let us return now to the naval problem and see if any of these three 
conditions were present:— 
( a .) In the open sea there, are no obstacles, and owing to the 
umpire rules, no retarding force of Blue could delay its 
adversary without being itself destroyed. 
( b .) The communications were not open, as the narrow strait 
opposite Belfast must be traversed. Belfast was a hostile 
fortified port, and contained a torpedo-boat flotilla. 
(c.) For a fleet “ supplies” is only another word for coal, and 
from Broadhaven to Dublin on the Irish Coast, or to 
Whitehaven on the English, there was no point at which 
the Central Reserve could coal, and, consequently, after a 
very short time it would have to leave its central position 
in' order to replenish supplies, and then one or other of 
the retarding forces would be liable to be destroyed. 
Clearly, then, the strategy suitable to the land problem was totally 
inapplicable to the naval one. Let us see how Admiral Seymour 
proposed to solve it. 
Admiral Knowing that many ships of the Red fleet were faster than his own, 
Se pian Ur,s determined to hurry both his divisions north, endeavour to form a 
junction off Belfast, and then turn on whichever of the Red divisions 
should be near him, in the hopes of crushing it before the other could 
arrive. 
C. Blue had nothing to fear from A. Red, the points being 38 to 32, 
