532 
COAST DEFENCE IN DELATION TO WAE. 
over-sea attack, suck as tke eastern shores of England were long ex¬ 
posed to, and as the sea-board of the Mediterranean suffered from to a 
much later date, would generally come as a stroke out of the blue. 
The growth of sea-borne commerce, which in other ways has wonder¬ 
fully moulded the destinies of the world, invested coast lines with 
supreme importance. There, at points favoured by nature, wealth and 
population quickly accumulated. There were built, fitted out, and 
assembled the war navies which sea-borne trade called into being. There, 
too, were definite objects of attack, and Coast Defence soon came to 
be regarded as a special branch of fortification. Navies, having become 
organised fighting bodies, were able to extend the sphere of their 
operations. The corsair, who lived by the plunder of commerce, could 
be attacked at home, and sought by artificial means to prolong his in¬ 
teresting existence. Thus, from early times fortified seaports were the 
centres from which “ sea power 3> radiated. While, however, the 
possession of natural harbours is a necessary condition of maritime 
strength, their defences are wholly subordinate. Such defences are in 
themselves no source of sea power, to which they may, nevertheless, 
bring aid in limited measure. It was not by means of Coast Defences 
that Carthage and Rome won their position in the Mediterranean. 
Out of the conflicts which were waged for the possession of points 
on the sea-board, I have selected the following, spread over a wide 
period, as typical ; but my time will only permit a brief reference. 
Natural advantages, geographical position, and a navy gave an im¬ 
portance to Syracuse which provoked the jealousy of Athens and led 
to the siege of 414 B.C. The sea front was unassailable, and the 
besieging force under Nicias and Alcibiades proceeded to wall in the 
defenders on the land side. The Athenian party within were urging 
surrender when a Corinthian ship arrived bearing the promise of naval 
aid. Three naval actions having taken place, resulting in the defeat of 
the Athenians, the siege was raised. It is remarkable that Nicias, in a 
letter quoted by Thucydides, seems to have fully grasped the fact that 
the success of his undertaking must be decided on the sea. Two 
hundred years later Syracuse, which had espoused the Carthagenian 
cause after Cannae, was attacked by a Roman fleet and land force. 
Marcellus, commanding the former, was fully provided with all the 
appliances of the age; but, the naval attack being easily repulsed by 
the engines of Archimedes, the port was merely watched during the 
winter of 213-212 B.C. The Carthagenian relieving fleet, however, 
sailed away to Tarentum, not daring to meet the Romans, and the fate 
of Syracuse was sealed. 
Rhodes, in 1480, was very indifferently fortified, but was held by the 
flower of the Knights of St. John under one of their greatest Grand 
Masters. The Turks, absolute masters of the sea, disembarked 70,000 
men, with a formidable artillery, in the bay of Trianda, and a purely 
land siege was commenced, varied only by the employment of fire¬ 
ships by the besieged. After the failure, with heavy slaughter, of the 
great assault of the 27th July, the Turks withdrew. Again attacked 
in 1522, Rhodes fell after a six-months’ land siege. The fortifications 
had been much strengthened, but the supply of powder proved made- 
