COAST DEFENCE IN RELATION TO WAR. 
533 
quate to the extensive counter-mining operations, and no relief was 
forthcoming. On the day after the surrender a fresh Turkish fleet 
hove in sight. 
The fortifications of Valletta in 1565 were of an elementary descrip¬ 
tion—a small fort at St. Elmo point, the Castle of St. Angelo, a line 
across the peninsula, and some outlying defences at Senglea. 
The Turks, about 30,000 strong, with a heavy artillery—60-prs., 
80-prs., and one 160-pr.—landed on the 18th May in Marsascirocco 
and proceeded to besiege St. Elmo, which fell on the 23rd June, after 
one of the most brilliant resistances recorded in history. The quaran¬ 
tine harbour was thus opened to the besiegers, who were able thence to 
carry their galleys over into the grand harbour. The land siege of St. 
Angelo was then prosecuted and a boat attack attempted. Repeated 
assaults failed, but the resources of the defenders were nearly exhausted 
when, on the 24th August, a relieving fleet from Sicily arrived, and 
the siege was abandoned. 
The fortification of Valletta subsequently received the enormous 
development we see every day. As has been well said, it became “the 
sole care of the Government,” and “ ended in being a matter of pure 
ostentation.” Meanwhile, the fighting powers of the Knights of Malta 
unquestionably diminished in proportion to the supposed technical 
perfections of their fixed defences. Whether this decadence was the 
result of over-fortification or the over-fortification, the result of deca¬ 
dence need not be here considered. In any case, this tremendous 
fortress was surrendered to Napoleon in 1798 with hardly a show of 
resistance. No attempt was made to force the entrance of the harbours, 
and the French troops were landed at several points, subsequently con¬ 
verging upon the land front. 
Immense efforts were made by France and Spain for the capture of 
Gibraltar at a period (1779) when Great Britain was at war with three 
leading naval Powers and with the American Colonies. The land siege 
was supported by a powerful fleet, and special vessels were employed 
in the attack of the sea front, which was nevertheless extraordinarily 
ineffective. With exceptional natural advantages on the land side, an 
able commander, and a fine garrison, the only danger was that of the 
exhaustion of supplies and ammunition. We have every right to be 
proud of this memorable defence; but it should never be forgotten that 
the success was rendered possible only by successive efforts made by 
the British Navy at a sacrifice of other objects of great—perhaps 
greater—importance. 
At Sebastopol the issue turned upon a competition between sea and 
land transport, which, under the conditions of 1854, could not be 
doubtful. The fleets of Great Britain and France possessing absolute 
command, supplies and reinforcements for the land siege could be for¬ 
warded under peace conditions, while the Russians depended wholly 
upon long and almost impassable roads. When once Russia determined 
to stand at bay in the Crimea, the result was merely a question of time 
and of the persistence of the Allies. The coast defences, which were 
permanent, costly and considerable, played a wholly subordinate part. 
The land defences, which were almost entirely non-existent on the side 
