534 
COAST DEFENCE IN RELATION TO WAR. 
selected for attack, but were subsequently created by Todleben^s 
genius, dictated tbe measure of the resistance. 
.Admiral Duponts armour-clads made no impression on the defences 
of Charleston in the attack of the 7th April, 1863, and the action of 40 
minutes ended in withdrawal with the loss of one vessel. Morris Island 
having been occupied by a military force, Fort Wagner fell to a regular 
siege on the 7th September, and Sumter, the one permanent defence of 
the harbour, was soon reduced to a ruin. 
The island of Lissa, fought for on the sea and saved by British 
frigates in 1811, was comprehensively attacked by a powerful Italian 
fleet in 1866. The harbour of San Giorgio and the anchorages of 
Camissa and Manego were defended by miserable works, mountiug 
60-pr. smooth-bores and a few rifled 60-prs., to which Admiral Persano 
opposed four armour-clads, one monitor, eight partially armoured 
frigates, and 14 other vessels. The monitor and two of the armour- 
clads carried 300-pr. Armstrong guns, and the armament of the 
squadron in all respects was far superior to that of the Austrian 
defences. The attack of the 18th July was mainly directed against 
San Giorgio, and no result was obtained after a great expenditure of 
ammunition. On the following day a fresh attempt was made, the 
Formidabile entering the harbour only to be rendered hors de combat. 
At eight next morning the approach of Tegethofs squadron was sig¬ 
nalled, and the action which followed secured the immunity of every 
Austrian port. 
This series of notable attacks on fortified ports is spread over 2300 
years. Gunpowder had replaced twisted sinews; the feeble artillery 
of the 15th and 16th centuries had developed into the relatively power¬ 
ful armaments of 1866 : the galley had grown into the three-decker, to 
be in turn superseded by the armour-clad steamer. Yet all the 
governing principles and the conditions by which the issues were de¬ 
termined remained practically unchanged. 
Thus in every case, while the purely naval attack failed altogether, 
as at Syracuse, Gibraltar, Sebastopol and Lissa, or was not attempted, 
as at Rhodes and Malta, the fate of the fortified port depended absolu¬ 
tely upon sea power, actively asserted at Syracuse (414 B.C.), Gibraltar 
and Lissa, operating as a menace at Syracuse (212 B.O.) and Sebasto¬ 
pol. Fleets uniformly ineffective in the direct attack, whether equipped 
with the crude appliances of Marcellus, or the rifled 300-prs. of Persano, 
nevertheless dictated the issue. The success or failure of the defence 
turned upon purely naval considerations. Syracuse would have been 
saved if BomilcaFs squadron had been able to defeat or to overawe that 
of the Romans; Lissa must inevitably have fallen if the Italian navy had 
obtained command of the Adriatic. Again, the attack invariably took 
the form of a land siege, rendered possible only by naval transport, and 
the subordinate issue was decided precisely as in the case of an inland 
fortress, by the available resources, fighting power, and land front 
defences of the besieged. 
The defenders of Rhodes in 1480 were able by sheer fighting capacity 
to inflict losses sufficient to cause the withdrawal of the besiegers; but 
the primary condition of real success being on the side of the Turks, the 
