COAST DEFENCE IN RELATION TO WAR. 
535 
fortress was nevertheless doomed to fall. Malta and Gibraltar were 
both saved by relieving fleets, while Syracuse fell to the Romans, be¬ 
cause their squadron dominated the situation. This similarity cannot 
be the result of accident, and it points to a law which may be formulated 
as follows :— 
Attacks on an enemy's fortified ports across the sea are generally 
undertaken for naval objects, are practicable only on condition of full 
naval superiority, and to be effective must assume the form of military 
operations on shore, supported by a covering naval force able to main¬ 
tain communications. 
These military operations on shore may, of course, and often, have 
been successfully carried out by sailors when their scale was compara¬ 
tively small; but they may nevertheless be distinguished from the direct 
naval attack which specialised coast defences are intended to oppose. 
Apparent exceptions to this law exist in such cases as Algiers (1816), 
Acre (1840), and Foochow (1884), where the object sought was attained 
by purely naval means. At Algiers, however, was concentrated all 
such power as was at the command of a semi-barbarous people. Acre 
held an Egyptian force practically hemmed in by a hostile Syrian 
population. The defences of Foochow were turned by a French 
squadron, which had lain inside them for weeks before declaring war— 
a proceeding possible only in the case of semi-civilised and unorganised 
Powers. Moreover, so ineffectual were the operations that a vessel was 
launched from the dockyard of Foochow within a short time of the 
bombardment. Conversely the fate of Acre, besieged by Napoleon in 
1799, was decided by an insignificant British naval force operating 
securely after the battle of the Nile. Alexandria, in 1882, will at once 
occur to your minds as another exception; but defective gunnery on 
the part of the Egyptians goes far to explain the result. The heavy 
rifled guns, of which 33 were brought into action, had been rarely, if 
ever, used previously; but the practice made with the old smooth-bores, 
which were not even provided with sights, was remarkable. 
The record of Coast Defences, broadly speaking, has been of a nega¬ 
tive character. They have played a subordinate part in the history of 
war; but they may have operated as a deterrent against purely naval 
attack in cases when this form of proceeding might have been effective 
had they been absent. The extravagance to which they have given 
rise naturally creates a reaction, and extremists proclaim their general 
uselessness. 
Coast Defence, however, when applied in accordance with strategic 
principles and rigidly kept within the limits of real requirements, can 
undoubtedly add to the security of a State. Upon these principles, 
and upon the just measure of these requirements turns the whole 
question of national advantage or national delusion. While the extent 
of the defences of Toulon to-day defies all rational justification, it is 
futile to argue that Toulon ought not to bo fortified at all. We may 
perhaps lay down the following general rule : — “ Coast Defences are 
required for ports containing resources necessary for the purposes of 
war or commerce, and their standard should be such as to effectually 
prevent an enemy from seriously injuring those resources by purely 
