536 
COAST DEFENCE IN RELATION TO WAR. 
naval action.” This is delightfully vague, as a general rule should he, 
and it at once opens up the question as to what force an enemy could 
apply to the purpose—a question to which the answer depends entirely 
upon naval considerations. It will serve, however, to explain my con¬ 
tention that, if carried beyond a certain point, Coast Defences are of 
no use whatever. When once protection against purely naval attack 
has been provided, the issue will then depend upon the manner of 
resistance which can be made on shore. But the possible strength of 
naval attack will be determined by the power of your own navy, which 
also can alone prevent an enemy from bringing all his military resources 
to bear against you. The naval impotence of Russia, in 1854-5, 
rendered it possible for Great Britain and France to employ all their 
military resources against Sebastopol, and if the British Navy cannot 
hold its own in the Mediteranean, there is hardly any limit to the mili¬ 
tary force which could be brought to bear upon Malta, if the object to 
be gained was thought sufficiently important. 
The changes arising under modern conditions, and the so-called 
revolution effected by modern armaments, are frequently referred to as 
pretexts for the extravagant standards of the day. Those changes are 
of minor importance in regard to the present question. No revolution 
in the relative power of attack and defence has ever occurred. The 
enormous development of sea-borne trade since the period of great 
naval wars, which ended in 1815, has made new demands upon fight¬ 
ing navies—not upon Coast Defence, which loses importance in 
proportion to the value of property at sea and to the national need of 
its continuous transit. The value of the sea-borne trade of the Empire 
in 1891 was upwards of £970,000,000. It is by the movement of that 
trade that we live, and if it were locked up in protected ports it might 
almost as well be captured or destroyed. Steam, replacing sail power, 
has. rendered coal the first need of fleets; but naval bases were as 
necessary in Nelson's day as in our own. Their strategic importance 
remains unchanged, though their appliances and resources must now 
be different in kind and greater in extent. Naval operations in distant 
waters have always demanded secure harbours, which may now be 
required at more frequent intervals along a line of communications, but 
are not, therefore, intrinsically more valuable. 
The free use of coal in distant seas will turn upon naval supremacy, 
and the navy which commands the sea will find little difficulty in secur¬ 
ing its coal supply. Docks and refitting appliances, which cannot be 
transported across the world or extemporised, are essential to the free 
action of a navy whatever its strength. 
Advances in armaments adding power both in attack and defence 
have not materially affected the balance between them. The ship was 
never capable of attacking a well placed and well designed coast battery 
on equal terms, as the engagements off Cape Licosa, in the Gulf of 
San Fiorenzo, and against the Wasp and Telegraph batteries at Sebas¬ 
topol clearly pro ye. Increased range and accuracy of fire have not 
modified her disabilities, but have extended the zone within which she 
can be severely injured. The development of shell power involves far 
greater possibilities of injury to the ship than to the battery. In spite 
