588 
COAST DEFENCE IN RELATION TO WAR. 
necessary to capture an enemy’s fortified port, as in the striking case 
of Mauritius, we utilised naval superiority in tlie right way, and em¬ 
ployed an expeditionary force which did not concern itself with Coast 
Defence. 
Thus, throughout history ports were captured or saved, but the issue 
depended upon naval conditions, not on coast batteries. Instances 
might be multiplied almost indefinitely. 
In 1756 the strongly fortified position of Port Mahon fell to a French 
expeditionary force solely because the squadron under La Galissonniere 
dominated the situation. Our unfortunate Admiral was shot for failing 
to save this much fortified port, and, as I think Admiral Colomb has 
pointed out, naval officers, judging from this incident, may possibly be 
tempted to doubt whether fortified harbours tend to mitigate their 
many responsibilities. Eestored to Great Britain in 1763, Port Mahon 
was again taken by the French and Spaniards in 1782, the British Navy 
being then powerless in the Mediterranean. The naval situation hav¬ 
ing been restored, Port Mahon was re-occupied in 1798 by a British 
force without the loss of a man. Louisbourg, in 1745, provided with 
much coast defence and a regular garrison, fell in 49 days to the attack 
of a force mainly composed of New England volunteers. Eestored to 
France by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, Louisbourg was again captured 
in 1758. In these cases the immediate success as usual turned upon a 
land siege., but the issue was absolutely dictated by the naval situation, 
and this must always be the case of positions isolated by the sea from 
the parent State. Such positions lie at the mercy of the Power which 
establishes and maintains the command of the sea, and may not hope to 
find salvation in fixed defences. 
The case of home ports differs only by reason of the resources laying 
behind them. They can be seriously attacked only by a Power which 
has established complete naval superiority. Their capture is equivalent 
to successful invasion. Thus, modern developments of military forces, 
together with roads, railways and telegraph communication, have 
changed the aspect of the defence of the home ports of all great 
Powers. 
Operations, such as those which were successfully carried out against 
Cherbourg and attempted against Eochefort, are now possible only after 
the military forces of a nation have been crushed in the field. The 
back door in these cases is now guarded by the organised military 
resources of a nation, and these resources can be brought to bear upon 
the invader far more rapidly than formerly. Not only, therefore, does 
the inducement to attack such a port as Plymouth appear to be dimin¬ 
ished, but the possession by an enemy of the necessary naval condition 
of success would imply that the object for which Plymouth exists had 
already practically disappeared. The enemy would have accomplished 
his main ends, and ignoring Coast Defences, could proceed to invade, 
or rest satisfied with the destruction of British commerce. Similarly, 
if the British Navy is driven out of the Mediterranean and unable to 
return in force, it is not clear that the loss of a single life in an attack 
on Malta would be justified. So long as the fleet was absent, Malta 
