COAST DEFENCE IN RELATION TO WAR, 
539 
could bring no aid to the Empire, and its future fate would be decided 
by the general issue of the war. 
From what has been said I think it is evident that Coast Defence, 
using the word in the broadest sense, must be divided into two distinct 
elements, viz. ~ 
(1.) The means adopted to deny certain very limited waters to an 
enemy's vessels. This is Coast Defence in the ordinarily 
accepted meaning. 
(2.) The resources—men, organisation, supplies, land fortifica¬ 
tion temporary or permanent—available to resist the attack 
of forces landed outside the zone of protected water. 
This important distinction is rarely recognised, and while academic 
discussion naturally centres upon the first element, all history clearly 
shows that the measure of resistance of a fortified port usually depends 
upon the second. The one is in fact required only to oppose ships in 
their weakest capacity; the other may be confronted by the tremendous 
. forces which sea power can bring into play. Neither may safely be 
neglected; but while an undue extension of the first adds no strength 
whatever, the inadequacy of the second may render the whole scheme 
of defence valueless. 
Thus Coast Defence in the narrow sense demands merely that purely 
naval attack shall be rendered hazardous. If this condition is fulfilled, 
the attack is driven to fall back upon the method from which alone 
decisive results can be expected. If it is not fulfilled, results important, 
though restricted, can be attained by purely naval action. 
Ports containing exposed resources required for the use of a navy in 
war, or necessary for the shelter of a mercantile marine, must, therefore, 
be provided with defence. The command of the sea cannot be estab¬ 
lished at the outset of a war between naval Powers, and even when 
established will not secure such ports against naval raids. If the naval 
raider is able to destroy docks and stores, and to sink or capture ship¬ 
ping, injury in proportion to the strategic importance of the port and 
the value of its exposed resources will be inflicted. While, there¬ 
fore, the strong naval Power requires Coast Defences to avert the risk 
of losses which might hamper its action, the weaker naval Power may 
seek by their means to add to the difficulty of the task imposed upon 
an enemy. Even in this case, however, mere coast works will avail 
little, since the magnitude of the enemy's task will depend on the second 
element of defence. 
The mutual interdependence of fleets and Coast Defences forms a 
fertile subject of a controversy tending inevitably to fall into a vicious 
circle. The modern theory that Coast Defences confer freedom upon 
fleets appears to be unsupported by the teaching of war. Fleets able 
to keep the seas cover the ports from which they act much as a field army 
covers its base, and require Coast Defences in their rear, as the bases of 
an army may need protection against cavalry raids. 
I am afraid that you will all think that this paper is far too naval, 
and that you have been enticed here on false pretences. I will, there- 
