COAST DEFENCE IN RELATION TO WAR. 
541 
consider our fortifications. In the words of Lord Dundonald :—“ There 
is no security equal to that which may be obtained by putting it out of 
the power of an enemy to execute hostile intentions.” I do not believe, 
however, that we are unable to create and maintain an adequate navy 
as well as the extremely moderate defences which alone we need. I 
merely protest against the false notice that there is any sort of inter¬ 
changeability between the two, or that fixed defences can ever enable 
us to dispense with a single sea-going ship. 
My subject is a large one, and I have attempted only to deal with 
one aspect of it. The question of policy and the adoption of a true 
sense of scale should, I venture to think, come first. When these are 
settled, ring in the experts, and take particular care that they do 
not go back on every principle you have laid down. Designedly this 
paper has been made somewhat vague. I have not defined what 
strength is assigned to a naval raid, or laid down the measure of 
defence which I would provide in a given case. To do so would involve 
entering upon a variety of considerations foreign to my present pur¬ 
pose. The probable strength of what I have called a raid necessarily 
differs according to circumstances, political and geographical. The 
measure of necessary defence varies with the distance of a probable 
enemy's bases, and with local hydrographical conditions. Before either 
can be intelligently considered, it is, therefore, imperative to arrive at 
certain general conclusions, naval in their very essence. 
The points which I have sought to emphasize may now be briefly 
summed:— 
(1.) The strength which the attack can assume depends entirely 
upon the naval conditions. Defended ports will not be 
attacked by expeditionary forces, except by a Power in 
full command of the waters which give access to them. 
Given this command, there is little limit to the strength 
that may be brought to bear against them. 
(2.) Protection to ports containing resources necessary to the 
naval action of a great naval Power is always desirable; 
but it must be remembered in such a case that the pro¬ 
tected port is of no value except on account of what the 
navy may be able to do outside it. To provide extravagant 
defences and to starve the naval resources is, therefore, an 
imbecile policy. The first consideration is the sufficiency 
of the naval resources; the second, the defences. Similarly, 
protection is desirable for ports necessary to a mercantile 
marine in war; but, in the case of a Power which exists 
by commerce, this protection will not avail unless the sea 
approaches are guarded, which can be done only by a sea¬ 
going navy. 
(3.) No practicable naval supremacy will ensure complete im¬ 
munity from raids, which in the case of an enterprising 
enemy would be most probable at the outset of war. In 
such raids torpedo-boat attacks are obviously included 
where geographical conditions are favourable. While the 
