COAST DEFENCE IN RELATION TO WAR. 
543 
DISCUSSION. 
Captain Wilson, Y.C., R.N., said:—I think it my duty to rise to express 
the views of the whole meeting by thanking Sir George Clarke for his paper. 
(Cheers.) There is only one objection I have to make, and it is this : he has not 
left us a point open to criticism. (Hear, hear). If I am to criticise, I do not 
exactly see where to begin. (A laugh). As far as the Navy is concerned, we are 
all absolutely convinced that our trade—indeed, the existence and welfare of the 
Empire, depend on our being able to keep the control of the sea. (Hear, hear). 
But there is a possible danger of anybody carelessly listening to this lecture being 
led to think that fortifications are nowadays of very little use. Major Clarke has 
guarded himself against that statement, and I have paid particular attention to 
try and run him in. (Laughter). He has taken a very accurate view of the 
necessity of fortifications. There is no doubt that our position in the Mediter¬ 
ranean would be very much more useful if the French had not strongly fortified 
Toulon and converted it into a refuge for their ships ; and, also, if they had not 
erected a line of fortifications along the Coast of Africa, which might make it 
difficult for our cruisers to bring their fleet into action and enable us to fight 
them. In the same way, on our side, we should be in a most difficult position in 
trying to defend the trade route to the East if we had not Malta to fall back upon 
to replenish our stores, to coal, etc. We cannot expect to be supreme always and 
everywhere. We have it on the authority of a Member of the House of Commons 
that if war breaks out the necessity might arise for us to withdraw, for a time, 
from the Mediterranean, to return afterwards. In that case, I think we should be 
very glad to find that Malta has not been taken from us in the meantime. (Hear, 
hear). I think that I really have nothing else to say; I agree so thoroughly with 
the lecturer that I am utterly unable to criticise him. (Cheers). 
Captain Williams-'Wynn, R.A., said that, in his opinion, Coast Fortification 
might prove a very valuable ally to the other element of Coast Defence. Sir 
George Clarke undoubtedly had been very guarded in his statements on this 
point; but it seemed to him (Captain Wynn) that the lecturer had made out the 
trade of the Garrison gunner to be as valuable, perhaps, as smoked glasses to look at 
an eclipse—(oh ! oh ! and laughter)—not very useful; wanted once or twice in a 
hundred years. (Renewed laughter). The moral of Sir George Clarke’s lecture 
was that the best line of resistance for Coast Defence was not on the heights of 
the coast, but on the sea itself. The poet Campbell, it seemed, had had a due 
appreciation of the value of the sea power when he wrote-— 
“ Britannia needs no bulwarks, 
No towers along the steep.” 
But a later and perverse generation had, nevertheless, sunk a good deal of capital 
on “towers along the steep !” In the text-book of Fortification which was in 
use at Woolwich when he (Captain Wynn) was there, the question of fortresses 
was summed up as follows 
“ Fortresses, therefore, if placed and properly used, increase the force available 
to meet the enemy in the open field.” 
This referred to inland fortresses; but was it not also applicable to Coast 
Fortresses as well P It would appear that fortifications existed only for, and on 
account of, the Navy, and it appeared more logical to hand them over the entire 
management of the first element of Coast Defence, or to constitute a special 
Defence Corps under Naval Administration. At present the Navy, the Artillery, 
and the Submarine Mining branches all w r ork on their own lines, and if he 
(Captain Wynn) should suggest that he should be acquainted with the number 
and nature of the submarine mines which were within range of the guns of the 
