593 
BRIEF CONSIDERATIONS ON COAST DEFENCE. 
BY | 
MAJOR-GENERAL H. Le G. GEARY, C.B. 
Did an enemy's division escape (through a blockade), the general policy 
was not invalidated by such occasional failure. The first line of defence 
had been pierced at a single point; there still remained the other lines, 
the fortified posts and the soldiers behind them. 
A wisely co-ordinated system of defence does not contemplate that 
every point is to hold out indefinitely, but only for such time as may be 
necessary for it to receive the support which the other parts of the whole 
are intended to supply. That the navy is the first line of defence, both 
in order and importance, by no means implies that there is or should 
be no other. This forced and extravagant interpretation, for which 
naval officers have been largely responsible, of the true opinion that a 
navy is the best protection for a sea frontier, has very much to do with 
that faulty strategy which would tie the fleet, whatever its power, to the 
home ports. Navies do not dispense with fortifications nor with 
armies ; but when wisely handled, they may save their country the 
strain which comes when these have to be called into play. 
This kindly office did British seamen for Great Britain in the days of 
Napoleon. 1 
“A fish out of water." “ A swan on a turnpike road." “ Every 
cobbler to his last."— Proverbs. 
“ A sea-captain defending a citadel, a general manoeuvring a fleet."— 
Corrollary . 
Men-of-war carry three descriptions of armament, varying in weight 
and numbers, according to their size. 
It is improbable that an attack would be made on a coast battery 
without at least one first class battle-ship being included in the attack¬ 
ing force, the broadside of which may be taken at four heavy B.L. 
guns, corresponding to our 67-ton guns ; and six corresponding to our 
6-in. B.L. guns; besides quick-firing and machine guns. 
It is desirable that ships should not be allowed to close within 
2000 yards of an open battery, on account of these last, which would 
otherwise inflict heavy loss to the gun detachments. Therefore, when 
natural obstacles such as shoals or reefs do not exist, obstacles should 
i The Influence of SeR Power upon the French Be volution.” By Captain A. T. Mahan, 
D'.S.U. Vol. I., chapter XI., p. 341. 
12. VOL. XXI, 
