COAST DEFENCE AGAINST TORPEDO-BOAT ATTACK. 27 
pensed with. The lights all thrown back a little and raised while, 
though their general functioo may be to act as fixed lights, the central 
station must have the power of traversing them and changing the 
position of Z7. It is evident that the director of fire has now eight guns, 
IIOO’ 
CENTRALQSTATION E 
1 . 4 - 700 ' 
A D 
instead of four, to act with from the very first, and the light R can, as it 
were, now defend itself. If the reader will take the trouble to repeat the 
incidents of the attack he will see that the central station has the 
advantage of the boats, for the moves of the latter are met; they can 
no longer lurk in security close to a beam. 
Where no high ground is available the beating off of 
attacks becomes much more difficult. The garrison 
approaches the conditions of a ship ; and more guns 
are needed to make chance fire effective. There are, 
however, few harbours where, in one position or another, something 
could not be done after practical trial to improve the means of seeing 
and shooting at boats. 
One great difficulty Garrison gunners labour under is 
a want of knowledge of what they are exactly ex¬ 
pected to do with regard to repelling torpedo-boat 
attacks in each individual fortress, and a want of 
authority, where they do know,forarrangingtheirplans. TheNavy make 
their own schemes and often change them in accordance with their latest 
experience; defining areas into which they do not desire shore guns 
to shoot, arranging fresh boom defences, detailing guard-boats, etc., 
while the artillery, perhaps quite unaware of this, continue their 
training and arrangements with a view to defending the whole water 
area. Naval plans when examined are generally found to be based 
on the conjectured presence of a considerable naval force. If it could 
High ground 
a great 
advantage. 
Garrison 
Artillery doubt¬ 
ful of their role. 
