186 
AUTOMATIC SIGHTING. 
damaged it is only one of the sights of one gun disorganized, and not 
a group or battery command. 
A consideration of the volume of fire which can be poured from the 
decks of even a single battle-ship or cruiser should make us unwilling 
to incur unnecessary exposure of men or materiel , and careful to 
ensure that disorganization shall not be easy, even in the event of 
severe losses to both. 
IV.—The 'power of decentralization and its attendant benefits. 
There can be uo doubt that if we are to get the best value out of 
automatic sights our system of fire discipline with the heavier guns 
must be thoroughly remodelled, and this is anything but matter for 
regret. 
Take the present conditions. Imagine a battery commander at¬ 
tempting to direct the fire of a command of three or four groups, 
possibly composed of guns of different natures and with quite distinct 
arcs of fire ; served, perhaps, by a depression range-finder and two or 
more position-finders, the cells of the latter distant from him any¬ 
thing between 200 yards and two miles, with no direct communication 
to them except perhaps through an unreliable telephone situated 
occasionally at some distance from the B.C/s post; unable, maybe, to 
see his groups or to communicate with his gun group commanders 
except by orderly. 
The above is no fancy picture, and the spectacle is a sad one. It 
can be seen nearly every time that a battery command is manned 
completely and practised from as it would have to be in action. Its 
lessons are not brought home to us as clearly or as often as they 
might be, because this practice from an entire battery command under 
any approach to service conditions is of extremely rare occurrence, 
except when the command offers rather more than the usual facilities 
for fire direction. 
Automatic sights, assuming, which does not seem over sanguine, the 
supply of cordite to all guns fitted with them, provide us with an exit 
from all these difficulties. Some such simple scheme of fire direction 
as the following would meet the case. The fire of each gun to be 
observed by its own layer, of each group by its own group commander, 
of each battery command by its battery commander. The layer to 
correct his fire as an ordinary rule, the group commander if he thinks 
necessary, the battery commander only in the event of erratic shooting 
which does not seem to be meeting with attention : he will probably 
be well advised not to interfere unless he deems it absolutely essential. 
The control of his groups is thus in no way taken out of the B.C.’s 
hands. He will still order them to commence or to cease fire ; will 
select the part of the target to be attacked, and, where the F.C. does 
not do so, will select the target; will select the order of fire (though 
for the sake of effect it is natural to suppose that only the quickest 
rate of fire would be employed) . The orders of fire might be con¬ 
siderably simplified, and those now in force for Q.F. guns seem 
applicable. 
If necessary under this system more than one target might be 
