400 
COMMENDED ESSAY, 1899. 
engaged in active operations, and what will be the work required of 
Garrison Artillery in each case. These may be broadly divided into 
four classes: — 
A. War with a lesser power or small expeditions. 
B. Purely naval war without probability of invasion at home. 
C. Purely naval war, with probability of invasion at home. 
D. Non-maritime war, or attack of enemy’s country after com¬ 
mand of the sea has been gained. 
A. In this, Coast Artillery would take little or no part. It might, 
however, often be necessary to send a few siege guns or howitzers to 
the front, for which purpose, part of the movable armament from one 
of our stations abroad, or perhaps one or more siege train companies 
from home or India would be taken. Garrison Artillery might also 
be required to provide batteries of Maxim or Mountain guns, ammuni¬ 
tion columns, or other details. 
Our officers at all stations abroad, where movable armament is kept, 
must be prepared for this work and our siege train companies should 
be highly trained and ready for any emergency. 
B. This is the most probable case. Our enemies, though not strong 
enough to invade this country, might make things very unpleasant for 
us, by attacking our commerce and destroying our coal stores and 
arsenals. 
Coast Artillery then becomes all important and intimately connect¬ 
ed with the welfare of our Navy. 
We find the general opinion to be that in this case the attack of our 
ports and coaling stations by light and fast craft, torpedo-boats or 
otherwise, for the purpose of destroying shipping, etc. under the pro¬ 
tection of our guns, is likely to play a very prominent part; that in 
some cases, but very rarely, the enemy’s ships may try and run past de¬ 
fences for some definite purpose; that actual bombardments will not 
often be had recourse to, unless the enemy have command of the sea, 
and that then, as has almost always been the case in the past, the 
ships will merely keep the sea front of a fortress occupied, while the 
works are being attacked in rear by landing parties, or by troops dis¬ 
embarked some way off, as was done at Santiago last year. As a 
maritime power we are exposed to any of these forms of attack, but 
more especially to torpedo-boat raids, shortly after, or in some cases 
even before, the declaration of war is known, and little or no time will 
be available for drill. We should then be in a constant state of readi¬ 
ness in all matters appertaining to coast defence, and our officers 
should be prepared to resist any form of attack from the sea, and at 
stations abroad, from the land side also. 
The importance of this land defence of coast fortresses seems to be 
hardly realised, and there is an idea that it would never be necessary 
unless our Navy was completely destroyed; but it is not difficult to 
imagine a temporary reverse in distant seas, in which case the enemy 
might possibly effect a landing, and either capture or destroy some of 
our coaling stations, before reinforcements could be sent to their relief. 
This point is very clearly brought forward by Major E. G. Nicolls, in 
the Prize Essay for 1895; he rightly urges its recognition and the 
