462 
THE IRISH MANOEUVRES, 1899. 
giving a total of about 5,200 men, 16 guns, and 1,100 horses. 
Both forces were provided with regimental transport sufficient to 
carry their camp equipment—the intention being that the troops 
should encamp on the ground they occupied at the termination of 
each day’s manoeuvres. As, however, food and forage were not 
carried regimentally, it was necessary to select beforehand certain 
sites which were available for camps, and stock these places with sup¬ 
plies. To some extent the actual manoeuvring had to be regulated 
by the above considerations, but otherwise the operations were carried 
out under active service conditions. 
The general and special ideas were as follows: — 
General Idea. 
A main Blue Army (imaginary) has landed in GALWAY BAY, and 
is marching on DUBLIN, where a Red Army (imaginary) has con¬ 
centrated to oppose it. 
The fall of CORK, which has been beseiged, has set free a second 
Blue Force to join the Main Blue Army. 
A force is detached from the Red Army to prevent the junction of 
any Blue troops from CORK with their main Army, and, if possible, 
to destroy them and rejoin at DUBLIN. 
N.B.—(1). Railways are not available for use by either force; (2). 
Telegraphs as they exist, are available for both forces; (3). Without 
bridging material or boats, the River Nore is impassable, except at 
the recognized points of passage. 
Special Idea ( Red ). 
On August 8th, the Red Force detached towards CORK, reaches 
KILDARE, and information is received that a Blue Force (a brigade 
of cavalry and a brigade of infantry with artillery) has reached 
THURLES marching in a north-easterly direction. 
Special Idea ( Blue ). 
The BlueForce from CORK is ordered to march, via THURLES- 
JOHNSTOWN - DURROW - STRADBALLY, to join the Blue 
Army near KILDARE. On August 8th it reaches THURLES. 
A glance at the sketch accompanying this paper will show the diffi¬ 
culty of the task entrusted to the Blue Commander. Interposed 
between his force and, blocking his juncture with the main Blue Army, 
was a Red Force of superior strength. Two alternatives were open 
to him. He could either await the enemy’s attack in a chosen position 
and hope to fight a successful battle, but with no strategical advantage 
in his favour; or he could attempt a flank march past his opponents’ 
right, with the certainty, if attacked, of being compelled to form line 
to a flank and fight at great strategical disadvantage. He had one 
initial advantge, viz., a superiority in cavalry: 6 squadrons against 4. 
The Red Commander’s task was easier. Marching south-west, his 
clear course was to keep his force concentrated, find out his enemy as 
quickly as possible, force him to deploy on a line parallel to his line of 
advance, and, after defeating him, drive him off the THURLES-KIL- 
